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
EYES TO SEE: THE FOOTHOLD OF JIHADI UNDERPINNINGS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature: 

05 April 2007

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ABSTRACT

The magnitude of the Jihadi threat confronting the West goes largely unrecognized because of Western civilization's unwillingness to explore the underpinnings of Jihadi conduct. These underpinnings are well-established and rigorously authenticated precepts that serve as a foothold for Jihadi conduct, making Islam a ready-made ideology that suits the Jihadis' insatiable goals for territorial conquest and a religious-based totalitarian government. The West's disinclination towards exploring these underpinnings is partly due to its entrapment within a self-referencing inward spiral of cognition that blinds it to the genuine intentions of its Jihadi foes. Likewise, the Jihadis are trapped within an expanding outward spiral of cognition based upon a system of unyielding and self-legitimizing expansionist concepts. Preventing the eclipse of Western civilization is dependent upon the West's timely recognition of the revolutionary Jihadi vanguard as a peril to its existence.

This paper first demonstrates how the West is unwilling to recognize the threat it faces because of political correctness and an uncontested intellectual emasculation. These elements forge a mirror-image perception of the enemy that has created a self-referencing lexicon in the war on terrorism. As the West's lead agent in the war on terrorism, the United States Government has failed to accurately define the threat it faces, thereby creating disparate efforts in quelling Jihadi exertions. The second part of this paper discusses the underpinnings of Jihadi conduct, their fixed nature, and how they are being used as a foothold to carry out a long-term campaign for world domination. Lastly, this paper highlights the magnitude of the Jihadi threat and how the West must fully awaken in order to posture for survival.

To my sons, Michael and Sammy, who will serve in a world much different than the one in which I lived. I have no greater charge. May God bestow them with eyes to see and courageous hearts to always do what is right and just.

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INTRODUCTION

This is no time for ceremony. The question before the House is one of awful moment to this country. For my own part I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery; and in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the freedom of the debate. It is only in this way that we can hope to arrive at truth, and fulfill the great responsibility which we hold to God and our country. Should I keep back my opinions at such a time, through fear of giving offense, I should consider myself as guilty of treason towards my country, and of an act of disloyalty towards the majesty of heaven, which I revere above all earthly kings.¹

*Patrick Henry
Address to the Virginia House of Burgesses, 1775*

Western civilization unwittingly faces a growing threat of annihilation because it fails to recognize the malignant intentions of Islamic Jihadis. The West has underestimated the magnitude of this threat because it has largely chosen to believe what it would like about those conducting apparently isolated terrorist acts. Ignoring the ideological underpinnings of their conduct only grants Jihadis more time to nurture legitimacy for their *jihād* against the West. Jihadis are intent on establishing a global caliphate with the ultimate destruction of all that does not conform to their purist interpretation of Islam.

The magnitude of the Jihadi threat confronting the West goes essentially unrecognized because of Western civilization's unwillingness to explore the underpinnings of Jihadi conduct. These foundations are well-established and rigorously

¹Patrick Henry, Address to the House of Burgesses, St. John's Church, Richmond, Virginia [23 March 1775]; available from <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/henry.htm>; Internet; accessed 05 January 2007. On March 23, in Virginia, the largest colony in America, a meeting of the colony's delegates was held in St. John's Church in Richmond. Resolutions were presented by Patrick Henry putting the colony of Virginia "into a posture of defense...embodying, arming, and disciplining such a number of men as may be sufficient for that purpose." Before the vote was taken on his resolutions, Henry delivered his famous "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death" speech, imploring the delegates to vote in favor. He spoke without any notes in a voice that became louder and louder, climaxing with the now famous ending. Following his speech, the vote was taken in which his resolutions passed by a narrow margin, and thus Virginia joined in the American Revolution.

authenticated precepts that serve as a foothold for Jihadi conduct, making Islam a ready-made ideology that suits the Jihadis' insatiable goals for territorial conquest and a religious-based totalitarian government. The West's disinclination towards exploring these underpinnings is partly due to its entrapment within a self-referencing inward spiral of cognition that blinds it to the genuine intentions of its Jihadi foes. Likewise, the Jihadis are ensnared within an expanding outward spiral of cognition based upon a system of unyielding and self-legitimizing expansionist concepts. Preventing the eclipse of Western civilization depends upon the West's timely recognition of the revolutionary Jihadi vanguard as a peril to its existence.

Given the nature of Jihadi ideology, correctly assessing the scale of this threat is foremost in designing an effective counterstrategy and mustering the required unity of effort to successfully employ it. The West's ability to recognize the magnitude of this threat is directly proportional to its readiness to combat it upon full manifestation. Timely perception will be the decisive element on the front end of a potentially larger clash of civilizations. Ultimately, victory will depend upon the will to preserve the enlightened civilization Western society has worked so hard to establish—losing means annihilation, or as a minimum, submission to oppressive totalitarian rule.

In demonstrating this thesis, this paper first describes how the West is unwilling to recognize the threat it faces because of political correctness and an uncontested intellectual emasculation. These elements forge a mirror-image perception of the enemy that has created a self-referencing lexicon in the war on terrorism. As the West's lead agent in the war on terrorism, the United States Government has failed to accurately define the threat it faces, thereby creating disparate efforts in quelling Jihadi exertions.

The second part of this paper discusses the underpinnings of Jihadi conduct, their fixed nature, and how they are being used as a foothold to carry out a long-term campaign for world domination. Lastly, this paper highlights the magnitude of the Jihadi threat and how the West must fully awaken in order to posture for survival.

CHAPTER 1: EYES TO SEE

*...it is natural to man to indulge in illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth, and listen to the song of that siren till she transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number of those who, having eyes, see not, and having ears, hear not, the things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst, and to provide for it.*²

Patrick Henry
Address to the Virginia House of Burgesses, 1775

*We are five years into fighting these people, where they can't be any clearer than they are about who they are, why they are fighting, and how they are fighting. ...Five years—and people still think that instead of looking at the enemy we've been fighting for five years they can get more out of studying Chinese insurgency of the 1940s. That to me bespeaks a level of denial that is going to be catastrophic. And it's going to be catastrophic on citizens who thought they were paying us \$400 billion a year, and \$70 billion a year on intelligence, to get it right.*³

Stephen Coughlin
Intelligence Analyst and Author, 2006

Chapter Introduction

The outcome of the “generational struggle” facing the West today, and the required level of effort it will ultimately have to expend in fighting it, depends upon its willingness to look this threat squarely in the eye and confront it directly.⁴

Unfortunately, Western society has yet to acknowledge the grave danger it faces concerning militant Islam. Perhaps the reason is the illusion of hope Patrick Henry spoke of over 230 years ago.⁵ Regardless, the West, paralyzed by political correctness, has corporately chosen to limit its examination of this looming threat. Democratic Western

²Henry.

³Stephen Coughlin, interview by author, 14 November 2006, tape recording, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

⁴President, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006): 21; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/>; Internet; accessed 23 October 2006. “To better prepare ourselves for a generational struggle against terrorism and the extremist ideologies fueling it, we will create an expert community of counterterrorism professionals.”

⁵Henry.

societies have allowed themselves to become inebriated by political correctness, thus creating a self-imposed intellectual emasculation.

Through this failure to reason and think for themselves, Western societies have bought into the myth that they are unable to understand Islamic culture using their own faculties, simply because they are not themselves Muslim. As a result, the West has been told what to think about Islam by so-called *cultural experts*. In addition, the hypersensitivity towards offending anyone has fueled Islam's untouchability. The resultant intellectual stupor in which the West now finds itself leaves it in a very precarious position with respect to its Jihadi enemies—it is deaf, dumb, and blind, and has yet to accurately define the enemy.

A review of U.S. Government documents reveals a significant lack of consensus in defining the enemy in the war on terrorism. Without a clearly defined enemy, it becomes practically impossible to muster adequate unity of effort for prosecuting this war. Harnessing government efforts will mean scrutinizing *all* aspects of the enemy in order to accurately identify and describe him. Much like a blindfolded child swinging wildly at an elusive piñata, endeavors in the war on terrorism are misguided and have often missed the mark. Until the West removes its blindfold and is willing to fully examine the underpinnings that govern the enemy's conduct, its efforts will remain hobbled and disparate.

See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil

Section Introduction

There are indications that the war on terrorism could escalate into a significantly larger conflict for the West. The enemy has clearly defined political goals from which he

has not backed down; he continues to wage a global *jihād* in defiance of the West, gaining more traction for his cause; and his numbers continue to grow as throngs of Muslims observe the apparent legitimacy of this global *jihād*. Understanding this pending struggle means correctly assessing the motives of this elusive enemy and where the West might reside along the spectrum of conflict in the war on terrorism. Clausewitz noted the following regarding such assessment:

The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war...the closer will war approach its abstract concept [pure violence], the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.⁶

The enemy has openly stated he possesses “powerful and inspiring motives for war,” thereby indicating he intends to destroy the West as his foe. Many “kind-hearted” Westerners would like to believe their enemy’s motives are somewhat less intense and therefore can be appeased at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict through political directives such as a “battle of ideas.”⁷ At this point in the conflict, the fervor with which the West engages its enemy is dependent upon how it interprets the enemy’s motives for war. Given time, the Jihadi threat will manifest itself to such a degree that the West as a whole will have no choice but to deal with it, as Clausewitz notes, in its most “abstract

⁶Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 99.

⁷*Ibid.*, 83. “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.”; President, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006): 1.

concept.”⁸ The West’s *limited* perspective has generated *limited* efforts to quell the advance of a determined foe because Western society values political correctness above swift and decisive victory.

Political Correctness

Though this political correctness appears to be a twentieth-century phenomenon that has burgeoned into the early part of the new millennium, it is actually an inherent part of all democratic societies. The great democratic danger, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, is enslavement to public opinion.⁹ With rights, comes responsibility—the responsibility to guard against this domestic tendency towards accepting every concept for fear of not offending its creator. Allan Bloom, in his book *The Closing of the American Mind*, describes the hazard of neglecting to cultivate a reasoning mind and the likely entrapment for failing to do so:

The claim of democracy is that every man decides for himself. ...Equal political right makes it impossible for church or aristocracy to establish the bastions from which they can affect men’s opinions....Even if men seek authority, they cannot find it where they used to find it in other regimes. Thus the external impediments to the free exercise of reason have been removed in democracy. Men are actually on their own in comparison to what they were in other regimes and with respect to the usual sources of opinion. This promotes a measure of reason. However, since very few people school themselves in the use of reason beyond the calculation of self-interest encouraged by the regime, they need help on a vast number of issues—in fact, all issues, inasmuch as everything is opened up to fresh and independent judgment—for the consideration of which they have neither time nor capacity....The paradoxical result of the liberation of reason is greater reliance on public opinion for guidance, a weakening of independence.¹⁰

Echoing the founding fathers, Bloom is suggesting that the strength of a democratic society depends upon reasoned debate. A democracy’s failure to think for itself and examine all aspects of a particular issue pertinent to the security of its society opens the

⁸Ibid, 99.

⁹Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 246.

¹⁰Ibid., 247.

doors to those who would seek to stifle the independent thought upon which that very democratic society depends.

Unfortunately, the penchant for appeasing others continues to draw Western society into the abyss of amorality and to discard any form of absolute principle. There exists a modern-day hubris which suggests:

...all the world was mad in the past; men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, persecutions, slavery, xenophobia, racism, and chauvinism. The point is not to correct the mistakes and really be right; rather it is not to think you are right at all.... There is no enemy other than the man who is not open to everything.¹¹

This is the paradigm that has gripped Western society. For those who espouse this way of thinking, it has provided a growing foothold to cow those who would stand up for right and denounce what is wrong. Political correctness is the religion of the day and has put the notion of reasoned debate against the ropes. In an article titled “How the West Was Lost,” Scandinavian writer Fjordman describes the thrust behind political correctness:

The impulse behind political correctness consists of twisting the language we use, enforcing new words or changing the meaning of old ones, turning them into “weapons of crowd control” by demonizing those who fail to comply with the new definitions.¹²

To critique or suggest any ill aspects of a particular group of people is to invite waves of protest and condemnations of hate speech. Rather than sparking public debate, such retorts actually stifle independent thinking and cause the masses to assent to what they are told to believe.

Regrettably, such political correctness pervades all branches of the United States Government. In its endeavor to use language that does not offend Muslims, the U.S.

¹¹Ibid., 26-27.

¹²Fjordman, “How the West Was Lost,” *The Brussels Journal*, 04 December 2006, [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1721/print>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2006.

State Department has adopted a euphemistic language of diplomacy that does not even permit the President to call Osama bin Laden and his suicide mass murderers “evildoers.”¹³ Based upon the vigor with which the U.S. has prosecuted the war on terrorism, political correctness has also arguably seeped deeply into the military establishment. Political correctness has shackled the military with overly-restrictive rules of engagement and made them question their resolve in “rid[ding] the world of evil.”¹⁴ Beneath the surface of military operations in the war on terrorism lies an uncertainty and timidity aroused by a fear of generating offense amongst the greater Islamic community, or the *Ummah*.¹⁵ The blitzkrieg liberation of Iraq held a tinge of political correctness that has only grown since that time:

Behind the “shock and awe” bombing of Baghdad and the bloody clashes in the south, some in the American and British camps seem keen to ensure that the Iraqi offensive doesn’t cause offense....It seems that the [politically correct] elements of this war are driven less by a newfound respect for Iraq than by a sense of uncertainty on America’s part. It is not a deep love for all things Iraqi that leads U.S. officials and commanders to make [politically correct] statements, but rather a deep uncertainty about their own mission in the world.¹⁶

¹³Jim Guirard, “Is it Holy ‘*Jihād*’—or Unholy ‘Irhabi Murderdom’???”; available from <http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/global.php?id=536734#>; Internet; accessed 11 January 2007.

¹⁴George W. Bush, Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, The National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., 14 September 2001; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010914-2.html>; Internet; accessed 21 November 2006. “...Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil....”

¹⁵Department of Homeland Security, National Intelligence Council Memo, “Who Wages Terror and *Jihād*: Pros and Cons of Frequently Used Terms,” 20 June 2005, NIC 3853-05; available from <http://www.intranet.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/caocl/Documents/PME/JFSC/FOUO%20NIC%20Memo%20-%20Who%20Wages%20Terror%20and%20Jihad.%20dated%2020%20June%202005%20v3.0.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2007. Access requires public-key infrastructure. The public-key infrastructure is the comprehensive system required to provide public-key encryption and digital signature services.

¹⁶Brenden O’Neill, “Waging Politically Correct War: The Inoffensive Offensive?,” *Christian Science Monitor* 95, no. 83:11 [database on-line]; available from Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost; accessed 12 December 2006.

In his *Armed Forces Journal* article, “The Hearts and Minds Myth,” writer and retired Army officer Ralph Peters criticizes the Bush Administration and its military leaders for falling into the politically correct trap that spares the murderer at the expense of his victims. An apologetic posture and a desire for a sterile war kept the American military from killing enough of the right people and communicating the U.S. intent to win.

As a result of this soft-handed posture, Peters concludes that insurgents in Iraq have been able to spend more than three years killing the people the Americans meant to liberate. American reluctance to kill evil men proved murderous to innocent men, women, and children. U.S. unwillingness to do what needed to be done leaves it at least partly responsible for the thousands of Iraqis killed and maimed by acts of terrorism—as well as for their own unnecessary losses.¹⁷ Current failures in Iraq and Afghanistan epitomize the warnings regarding limited use of force offered by Clausewitz almost 200 years ago. He cautioned:

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war. This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile—even wrong—to try and shut one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality.¹⁸

For the sake of its existence, Western society must, in fact, “follow suit” and engage the Jihadis with unapologetic and overwhelming force to drive them back into the realm of

¹⁷Ralph Peters, “The Hearts-and-Minds Myth: Sorry, But Winning Means Killing,” *Armed Forces Journal*, September 2006 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/1947271>; Internet; accessed 20 October 2006.

¹⁸Clausewitz, 83-84.

inconsequentiality. This will remain impossible, however, until it recognizes that it has become a Gulliver bound by the threads of its own politically correct strictures.¹⁹ The West must once again channel its political deliberations into reasoned public debate aimed at uncovering truth for the sake of cultivating the freedoms democratic societies offer. The West's apparent failure to think for itself has blinded it from the truth about the core motivations of the Jihadi vanguard. Meanwhile, the Jihadis have capitalized on the West's unwillingness to deeply examine Islam as a potential source of Jihadi conduct.

The Untouchability of Islam

The paralyzing effect of political correctness has impeded any rational public debate regarding militant aspects of Islam. Though the United States is well on its way towards full inebriation, political correctness has almost completely intoxicated European society. With large, growing Muslim populations within Europe, the resident Islamic community has been able to turn freedom of speech on its head and has intimidated Anglo-Europeans into believing anything that offends should be automatically characterized as hate speech. Fjordman asserts this notion of hate speech when describing a recent incident in Europe:

In Britain, after Nick Griffin, the leader of the British National Party, was cleared for stirring up racial hatred by calling Islam a “wicked, vicious faith,” Gordon Brown, by many considered [Prime Minister] Tony Blair’s likely successor, immediately pledged to strengthen hate speech laws: “I think any preaching of religious or racial hatred will offend mainstream opinion in this country and I think we have got to do whatever we can to root it out from whatever quarter it comes.”²⁰

¹⁹Jack Kelly, “The Ethiopian Example, How to Win a War: Unapologetically Use Force Against the Bad Guys,” *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 7 January 2007; available from <http://ebird.afis.mil/cgi-bin/ebird/displaydata.pl?WGSID=EFBABIDOJC>; Internet; accessed 07 January 2007.

²⁰Ibid.

This fervor for rooting out religious or racial hatred has become a false cause because the British citizenry has failed to address both sides of the coin. Instead of asking “What is wrong with us?” *and* “What is wrong with Islam?,” they limit their inquiry to the former. The result is a blind eye towards a threat that grows daily within the constituency of Great Britain. British journalist and author Melanie Phillips addresses this mounting problem in her 2006 book, *Londonistan*. She asserts:

Britain is in denial. Having allowed the country to turn into a global hub of the Islamic *jihād* without apparently giving it a second thought, the British establishment is still failing even now—despite the wake-up calls of both 9/11 and the London bomb attacks of 2005—to acknowledge what it is actually facing and take the appropriate action. Instead, it is deep into a policy of appeasement of the phenomenon that threatens it, throwing sops to both radical Islamism and the Muslim community in a panic-stricken attempt to curry favour and buy off the chances of any further attacks. This disastrous policy ignores the first law of terrorism, which is that it preys on weakness.²¹

Having dealt with the consequences of appeasement previously in its history, one might think Britain would be more sensitive to this insidious course of action. Unfortunately, Britain, like other Western nations, has made a *hopeful* choice in how it chooses to perceive the malignant menace of Jihadi ideology. Rather than allaying the threat, this politically correct alternative has simply emboldened Jihadi groups, thereby allowing their numbers continued growth. Phillips goes on to say:

Dismissing the idea that this is a religious war and that ideology is its principal weapon, the government thinks it can prevent young Muslims from falling into the clutches of al-Qaeda by promoting non-violent religious extremists. And so, far from regarding the Muslim brothers as a seditious force imperiling the country, it is recruiting them into the heat of the establishment.²²

Unfortunately, she is among the minority calling for an accurate examination of the Muslim community within Europe to root out any linkages between the Jihadi movement

²¹Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within* (London: Gibson Square, 2006), 273.

²²*Ibid.*, 255.

and the religion itself. Sadly, political correctness reigns in Europe and offers a fertile breeding ground for those who seek to take over the very societies in which they reside.

The reasons people shy away from acknowledging the religious aspect of the Jihadi problem are twofold. First, there is the very proper respect that should be afforded to people's beliefs. Secondly, the equally proper fear of unfairly demonizing an entire community must also be considered. But there is a risk to the whole community if the roots of the problem are censored and never dealt with.²³ Melanie Phillips goes on to describe how Muslims themselves stifle the debate that needs to take place:

The charge that pointing out the religious nature of this extremism is an act of bigotry against Muslims is deployed to shut down a vital debate that urgently needs to be held, not least within the Muslim community itself. The claim is a form of crude intimidation, and the fact that Britain is so cowed by it in itself shows how far it has already traveled down this dangerous path.²⁴

Muslims in Britain have been able to squash this debate and unapologetically wield politically-charged terms such as *Islamophobia* to further the Jihadi agenda:

...the claim of Islamophobia is deployed as a weapon to shut down legitimate and, indeed, crucial debate on the basis that to criticize a minority faith group is by definition an act of prejudice. A report published in 2004 by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia claimed that British society was "institutionally Islamophobic" and thus held Britain responsible for Muslim extremism.²⁵

Such propaganda, aimed at acquitting the *Ummah* of any responsibility for the actions of its fringe sickness, is leveraged in concert with the political correctness pervading Western society to establish an "untouchability of mainstream Islam."²⁶ To further bullet-proof the religion, Islam has taken strategic measures to veil itself in a shroud of

²³Phillips, 276-277.

²⁴Ibid, 277.

²⁵Ibid., 127.

²⁶Irshad Manji, *The Trouble with Islam Today: A Wake-Up Call for Honesty and Change* (Edinburgh, England: Mainstream, 2005), 62.

mystery and to convince the West it lacks the ability to understand the culture's intricate complexities.

Intellectual Emasculation

In 1978, pro-Palestinian activist Edward Said published a deconstructionist classic, titled *Orientalism*, aimed at discrediting the West's perception of Middle Eastern and Asian cultures. In this book, Said defines orientalism as "a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."²⁷ Said took exception to Western scholarship of Arab and Islamic culture, believing such work to be a reflection of the Western imperialist culture it represents and, hence, constructed to establish intellectual supremacy over the Orient by the simple fact of its being written.²⁸

He said:

Everyone who writes about the Orient must locate himself vis-à-vis the Orient; translated into his text, this location includes the kind of narrative voice he adopts, the type of structure he builds, the kinds of images, themes, motifs that circulate in his text—all of which add up to deliberate ways of addressing the reader, containing the Orient, and finally, representing it or speaking on its behalf....Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West. He is never concerned with the Orient except as the first cause of what he says. What he says and writes, by virtue of the fact that it is said or written, is meant to indicate that the Orientalist is outside the Orient, both as an existential and as a moral fact.²⁹

More practically, Saidists purport, "You as Westerners cannot possess the capacity to understand us because you are not one of us. Therefore, whatever you write or think will be flawed." Coupled with the rife political correctness in the West, this accusation of, "You think you're better than us," has proven to be disarming and has become a recipe

²⁷Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 3.

²⁸Stephen C. Coughlin, "To Our Great Detriment: Never Considering the Jihadis May Be Right About Islamic Law" (M.S. draft thesis., Joint Military Intelligence College, 2006), 7.

²⁹Said, 20-21.

for intellectual emasculation. According to Islamic law, Muslims would have Westerners practice holding their tongue in matters that are “beyond their understanding or capacity:”

When a book falls into a person’s hands concerning a subject he knows nothing about (*knows* meaning through having studied it with *sheikhs* who are masters of it) and has not learned by engaging in it at first hand, he should do absolutely nothing with the book, but rather return it to those whom it concerns. He should not believe, disbelieve, or discuss it at all.³⁰

In addition, Islamic law also prohibits those who do not understand Arabic from interpreting the *Qur’an*:

The *Qur’an* came as a proof of moral answerability against all mankind and *jinn*, while if interpreting it were not permissible, it could not be a decisive proof. Since it is decisive, it is permissible for someone acquainted with the dialects of the Arabs and the circumstances under which various verses were revealed to interpret it. As for would-be exegetes who do not know the dimensions of Arabic, the figurative, literal, and the types of metaphor, it is not permissible for them to explain it beyond what they have heard, by way of reporting and not actual interpretation.³¹

Predictably, *any* independent attempts by the West to examine Islamic culture, faith, or concepts as potential sources of Jihadi conduct will be met with some facet of the orientalism claim.

Unfortunately, very influential Westerners have readily agreed with this line of reasoning and have therefore contracted their intellectual thought on Islamic matters to so-called cultural experts. They rely on *Muslims* to tell them what they should think about Islam and how they should interpret religious texts regarding important threats to national security such as *jihād* and Islamic terrorism. Westerners have abdicated their

³⁰ Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law ‘Umdat al-Salik*, rev. ed., ed. and trans. Nuh Ha Mim Keller (Beltsville, Md.: Amanat Publications, 1994), 757. Book R “Holding One’s Tongue,” r20.3 “Reading Works that Are Beyond One’s Understanding or Capacity.”

³¹ Ibid. Book R “Holding One’s Tongue,” r14.2 “Explaining the Koran by Personal Opinion.” *Jinn* are spiritual creatures akin to angels in the Christian and Jewish faiths.

responsibility to reason for themselves under the assumption that what these *cultural experts* are telling them is truthful. Consider the following:

The entire effort of the enemy in the war on terror is to keep you from ever understanding who they are—to the point of having cultural experts tell you things for what Islam stands for, as a specific effect of accepting what they say, and never looking at those documents yourself.³²

Another aspect of this blind faith placed in cultural experts is the fact that they produce exactly what they are contracted to produce—answers that correspond to mirror-image perspectives of the threat. These *experts* are hired to conduct studies on *extremist* and *moderate* Islam, assuming there is such a thing. Such contracted thinking ends up being nothing more than mirror-imaging because products are requested that conform to the pre-existing Western lexicon that frames the war on terrorism. Because the West self-references and mirror-images itself in its perceptions of others, it cannot rationally fathom the acts of terror conducted by the enemy such as suicide bombings, attacks on innocent civilians, or airliners flying into office buildings. To the civilized Westerner, these all seem like irrational acts of some crazed foe. Therefore, they label these actions *radical*, *extremist*, or *terrorist*, and therefore these terms become part of the mental grid upon which the enemy is characterized and analyzed. Intelligence analyst and lawyer Stephen Coughlin addresses this self-referencing entrapment in a portion of his thesis:

Islam is not Christianity, Judaism, or Hinduism. Islamic law is not U.S. Constitutional, English common or European civil law. Hence, to measure against those standards, or to allow Current Approach advocates to explain along those lines, is to find incoherence and inability to explain—or predict—the rational decisions of a rational threat. This often leads one to erroneously conclude that we are facing an irrational threat making irrational decisions. Before being able to generate the ability to reliably plan against terrorism perpetuated in the name of Islam, one must first know Islamic doctrine and then

³²Coughlin, interview.

Islamic doctrine as it relates to Islamic concepts of war. To be able to do this, one must first read their doctrine.³³

Emancipating the West from these mental chains means taking Coughlin's suggestion to know and understand Islamic concepts of war as an imperative. The West *must* begin to think for itself regarding the ideological sources of Jihadi conduct.

Section Summary

For Jihadis, the religion of Islam *is* that ideological source. The current affinity for political correctness blinds the West, however, from even considering this reality. The illusion cast by Middle Easterners and Muslims that the West is incapable of understanding the true nature of Islam feeds that political correctness, in essence, creating a double negative that has anesthetized its will to reason. Therefore, for those charged with defending Western society against the scourge of *terrorism*, it is imperative to approach this religion as critical thinkers willing to objectively accept any unfavorable discoveries. Only then can the West begin to understand who the enemy is, define him using appropriate terms, and “direct every resource at [its] command” in a unified effort against him.³⁴

³³Coughlin, “To Our Great Detriment: Never Considering the Jihadis May Be Right About Islamic Law,” 23. By “Current Approach” Coughlin is referring to the methodology that has replaced the doctrinal Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process. Rather than emphasizing the standard IPB methodologies associated with doctrinal and situational templating, the Current Approach is grounded in *moderate* concepts of Islam starting with the assumption that Islamic-based extremism is aberrant and that Islam has become a *religion hijacked*. The consequence of (uncritically) accepting this assumption is that it brings with it an unstated corollary that because extremists do not represent *true* Islam, Islam itself should be excluded from analytical processes that support threat development.

³⁴George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>; Internet; accessed 16 October 2006.

Who's On First?

Section Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, the United States Government, as Western civilization's lead agent in the war on terrorism, has grappled with establishing a clear definition of the enemy. Current definitions use self-referencing terminology, are characterized by ambiguity, and reflect disparate understandings of the Islamic antagonists. *The 9/11 Commission Report* provided a thorough examination of the enemy, but was issued almost three years following the catastrophe. Attempts to define the enemy during the interim period set U.S. agencies on a course of ever-changing, politically correct definitions that have simply left them chasing their tails. The resultant lack of unified action throughout the U.S. Government has wasted innumerable resources and has simply prolonged the conflict. As representatives of the Western world, U.S. leaders must take control of the language in the fight against Jihadis and develop a clear, threat-based definition of the enemy upon which to focus all their efforts.

Self-Referencing Ambiguity

Just three days following the September 11th attacks, President Bush was already casting his vision for the “generational struggle” which had been placed before the United States.³⁵ During his remarks at the National Cathedral for the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance he stated, “...our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.”³⁶ In his book *Superpower Syndrome: America's Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World*, Robert Jay Lifton responded with the following:

³⁵President, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006): 21.

³⁶Bush, Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance.

The war on terrorism became apocalyptic, then, exactly because it was militarized and yet amorphous, without limits of time or place, and because it has no clear end. It therefore enters the realm of the infinite. Implied in its approach is that every last terrorist everywhere on earth is to be hunted down until there are no more terrorists anywhere to threaten us, and in that way the world will be rid of evil.³⁷

Use of such open-ended rhetoric to describe the national strategy for fighting Jihadis simply augments their already shadowy and elusive nature. President Bush's twists and turns in defining the enemy in the *war on terror* have bounced from *rid[ding] the world of evil*, to the *war against terrorist groups of global reach*, which eventually became the *global war on terrorism*. His vernacular has most recently morphed into what might be called the *global war on radicals and extremists*—a dramatic escalation of the war's already esoteric ambitions.³⁸

Again, such terms are self-referencing because they simply conform to the West's wishful paradigm that the enemy is a relatively small, yet malicious entity with *extreme* intentions. The U.S.'s obtuse mirror-imaging and low self-awareness is evident if one looks objectively at the relatively *extreme* ideals proposed in the leading paragraph of the President's own 2006 *National Security Strategy*:

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.³⁹

³⁷Robert Jay Lifton, *Superpower Syndrome: America's Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2003), 112.

³⁸Robert Parry, "Bush's 'Global War on Radicals'," *The Consortiumnews.com*, 23 December 2006; available from <http://consortiumnews.com/Print/2006/122206.html>; Internet; accessed 08 January 2007.

³⁹President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2006): 1; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>; Internet; accessed 19 October 2006.

Across the spectrum of history, the unification of democracy and statehood is a relatively *radical* concept. The U.S. is still in the throes of its “great experiment of self-government,” and even after 200 years many of democracy’s ideals have yet to fully manifest themselves.⁴⁰ Characterizing the enemy as *extreme* or *radical* is to overlook the overall strategic context in which *both* sides of this “generational struggle” participate.⁴¹ Simply being able to characterize the democratic ideals found in U.S. national strategy as *radical* and *extreme* illustrates the ambiguity of using such terms to describe its adversaries. Clearly, countless other global actors could be characterized using these descriptors, as well, thereby giving such terms almost infinite utility. In using such self-referencing terms, the U.S. is merely applying dizzying circular logic, while the enemy operates relatively permissively in the realm of obscurity which the U.S. itself has helped to create.

Even saying the enemy is *terrorism* is not entirely correct. Historian Michael Burleigh says, “Terrorism is a tactic—so it’s a bit like saying the Second World War was a War against Blitzkrieg.”⁴² In addition, when looking at the official U.S. Government definition of terrorism, the enemy it faces does not precisely correspond:

The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.⁴³

⁴⁰James A. Garfield; available from <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/presquotes1.html>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007; President James A. Garfield served as President of the United States March-September 1881 before being assassinated. He said, “We can not overestimate the fervent love of liberty, the intelligent courage, and the sum of common sense with which our fathers made the great experiment of self-government.”

⁴¹President, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006): 21.

⁴²Guy Raz, “Defining the War on Terror,” National Public Radio, 01 November 2006; available from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6416780>; Internet; accessed 11 January 2007.

⁴³Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Central Intelligence Counterterrorist Center, *Defining International Terrorism*; available from <https://www.cia.gov/terrorism/ctc.html>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2007. The DCI Counterterrorist Center website simply lists the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d).

Though this is a correct definition of terrorism, it has been misapplied to an adversary that also possesses religious motivations, and does not necessarily view those he attacks as noncombatants. The enemy facing the West is more specific than just the broad category of *terrorism*. Following almost three years of investigation, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States issued *The 9/11 Commission Report* asserting this notion:

But the enemy is not just “terrorism,” some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by *Islamist* terrorism—especially the al-Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.⁴⁴

It went on to define Islamism as “an Islamic militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is the restoration of the caliphate.”⁴⁵

Unfortunately, the dominant philosophy of political correctness kept the U.S. from making any associations with the Islamic religion. Therefore, despite the efforts of the 9/11 Commission, this definition of the enemy was largely disregarded.

Blind Men and the Elephant

By the time *The 9/11 Commission Report* was released, the U.S.’s hypersensitivity against offending Muslims had set the course for the ever-changing, amorphous characterizations previously discussed. American leaders have since failed to clearly define the enemy threatening their country, inciting confusion and disparity among government organizations, thus forcing them to individually define the enemy for themselves. The result has been an incomplete perspective of the enemy akin to the familiar fable written by an eminent *Islamic* theologian:

⁴⁴National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 362.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 562. Reference Chapter 12, endnote 3.

A community of blind men once heard that an extraordinary beast called an elephant had been brought into the country. Since they did not know what it looked like and had never heard its name, they resolved to obtain a picture, and the knowledge they desired, by feeling the beast—the only possibility that was open to them! They went in search of the elephant, and when they had found it, they felt its body. One touched its leg, the other a tusk, the third an ear, and in the belief that they now knew the elephant, they returned home. But when they were questioned by the other blind men, their answers differed. The one who had felt the leg maintained that the elephant was nothing other than a pillar, extremely rough to the touch, and yet strangely soft. The one who had caught hold of the tusk denied this and described the elephant as, hard and smooth, with nothing soft or rough about it, moreover the beast was by no means as stout as a pillar, but rather had the shape of a post. The third, who had held the ear in his hands, spoke: “By my faith, it is both soft and rough.” Thus he agreed with one of the others, but went on to say: “Nevertheless, it is neither like a post nor a pillar, but like a broad, thick piece of leather.” Each was right in a certain sense, since each of them communicated that part of the elephant he had comprehended, but none was able describe the elephant as it really was; for all three of them were unable to comprehend the entire form of the elephant.⁴⁶

Departments and agencies throughout the U.S. Government are struggling to generate a clear designation of the enemy because one has not been singularly and accurately articulated for them at the highest levels. This has made it impossible to achieve unity of effort in the war on terrorism and to develop coherent strategies and plans that complement each other. Table 1, *Defining the Enemy*, lists the national strategic guidance and key agency perspectives of the U.S. Government. Three evident conclusions emerge from the analysis of these definitions: first, most definitions subscribe to the self-referencing terminology described earlier in this paper (*radical*, *extremist*, *terrorist*, etc.); second, many of the definitions are abstract and ambiguous

⁴⁶Muhammed al-Ghazzali, *Ihya' `ulum ad-din*, vol. 4, Bayan wujub at-tawba (Cairo: 1933), 6; available from http://www.kheper.net/topics/blind_men_and_elephant/Sufi.html#al-Ghazzali; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007. The legend of the Blind Men and the Elephant originated in the Pali Buddhist Udana, which was apparently compiled in the second century B.C. It spread to Islam through the work of the orthodox Sufi theologian Muhammad al-Ghazzali (1058-1128 A.D.), in his *Theology Revived*. Ghazzali refers to the tale in a discussion on the problem of human action, a problem in which the inadequacy of natural reason becomes most evident. This is his version of the fable.

Table 1: Defining the Enemy

Current National Strategic Guidance	
Document	Enemy Definition
<i>National Security Strategy</i> March 2006	The transnational terrorists confronting us today exploit the proud religion of Islam to serve a violent political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom. ^a
<i>National Strategy for Combating Terrorism</i> September 2006	...a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals—and their state and non-state supporters—which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. ^b
<i>National Defense Strategy</i> March 2005	...a complex network of ideologically driven extremist actors....Today's war is against terrorist extremist networks, including their state and non-state supporters. ^c
<i>National Military Strategy</i> 2004	...transnational terrorist networks... ^d
<i>National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism</i> February 2006	...a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals—and their state and non-state supporters—which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. ^e
<i>National Strategy for Homeland Security</i> July 2002	...international terrorist organizations with the will and capability to attack the United States. The most dangerous of these groups are associated with religious extremist movements in the Middle East and South Asia. ^f
Key Agency Assessments	
Agency	Enemy Definition
<i>Department of State</i> <i>Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism</i>	Terrorist networks currently pose the greatest national security threat to the United States. ^g
<i>National Counterterrorism Center</i>	The enemy is not a defined state but more often a shadowy group of individuals. Indeed, there are numerous incarnations of the terrorist threat that endanger our Nation....First, of course, al-Qaeda remains our preeminent concern....Second, other Sunni terrorist groups...Third, and one of our greatest long-term concerns, is the emergence of new Jihadi networks and cells that are unaffiliated with al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations. These grassroots or "homegrown" elements may draw inspiration from al-Qaeda but operate independently, with little or no centralized guidance and control. ^h
<i>CIA</i> <i>Director of Central Intelligence</i> <i>Counterterrorist Center</i>	The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience...."international terrorism" means terrorism involving the territory or the citizens of more than one country...."terrorist group" means any group that practices, or has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. ⁱ
<i>FBI</i> <i>Counterterrorism Division</i>	...two very different threats from international terrorism: the attack planning that continues to emanate from core al-Qaeda overseas and the threat posed by homegrown, self-radicalizing groups and individuals—inspired, but not led by al-Qaeda—who are already living in the U.S. ^j

Sources: ^aPresident, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2006): 9; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>; Internet; accessed 19 October 2006.

^bPresident, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006): 5; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/>; Internet; accessed 23 October 2006.

^cDepartment of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America* (March 2005): 6-8; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf>; Internet; accessed 18 October 2006.

^dJoint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy* (2004): iv; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>; Internet; accessed 05 November 2006.

^eJoint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (01 February 2006) 3-4; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/docs/2005-01-25-strategic-plan.pdf>; Internet; accessed 23 October 2006.

^fDepartment of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (July 2002): 9-10; available from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 January 2007.

^gDepartment of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Defining the Enemy*; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2007.

^hCongress, House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, *Statement for the Record of The Honorable John Scott Redd, Director, National Counterterrorism Center before the House Armed Services Committee*, 109th Cong. 2nd sess., 04 April 2006; available from http://www.nctc.gov/press_room/speeches/20060404.html; Internet; accessed 17 January 2007.

ⁱCentral Intelligence Agency, Director of Central Intelligence Counterterrorist Center, *Defining International Terrorism*; available from <https://www.cia.gov/terrorism/ctc.html>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2007. The CIA does not provide a specific definition of the enemy in unclassified sources. The DCI Counterterrorist Center website simply lists the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d).

^jCongress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Statement for the Record of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 11 January 2007; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress07/mueller011107.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2007.

(*transnational, network, movement*, etc.); and lastly, the ranging definitions reflect disparate understandings of who the enemy actually is. All three of these characteristics facilitate a lack of unified action in prosecuting the war on terror. As *The 9/11 Commission Report* frankly states, “This vagueness blurs the strategy.”⁴⁷

Control of the Language

This self-imposed struggle in defining the enemy is evidence that U.S. leaders have lost control of the language in the fight at hand. Political correctness and mirror-imaging has

⁴⁷National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 362.

put the U.S. on the defensive in President Bush's "battle of ideas."⁴⁸ In debates between competing worldviews, the side that prevails is the one that succeeds at establishing its language as the language of the debate—controlling the language of the debate is to control its outcome.⁴⁹ While the U.S. has steered itself away from a threat-based definition of the enemy to avoid offending Muslims, Stephen Coughlin suggests just such a threat-based process for defining the enemy using the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process:

First of all, I think that what we do in terms of language depends on the outcome of a deliberate IPB process that gets to where that threat doctrine is and gets a handle on the language. I think where the threat defines itself with terms that have been defined at the doctrinal level, *by them*—those are the terms we use and those are the definitions you use. If you do not use that term as it is defined, you will wander, you will drift in your assessments. That at the red level, the language to be used—*their language*. And on the blue level, it shouldn't change unless there's a reason to....My point would be, the language we use has to be reality-based. If you decide that the enemy in the war on terror is extremist ideology I think you have submitted to Islam because you have accepted their argument that you are not allowed to associate Islam with terrorism. And in so doing, you can't define the threat....When I say that our definition of the enemy in the war on terror is not reality-based I mean, in fact, it has no corporeal form. Extremist ideology...you cannot non-kinetically attack that—you cannot kinetically attack it. You have to develop a second language to show what you mean when you say "extremist ideology." This is *total* surrender. You've taken away your ability even to template the enemy you define in the war on terror."⁵⁰

Stated more simply, The U.S. needs to call the enemy what he calls himself.

For example, during World War II, members of the National Socialist German Workers Party of Germany referred to themselves as *Nationalsozialists* which, in English, means "National Socialists." The term *Nazi* was adopted as a suitable term by

⁴⁸President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2006): 9.

⁴⁹U.S. Central Command, Memorandum for USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, *Knowing the Enemy II—The Language of Jihād* (11 October 2005), by Stephen C. Coughlin, Major, Military Intelligence, U.S. Army Reserve.

⁵⁰Coughlin, interview. The terms *red level* and *blue level* refer to the opposing perspectives in the assessment process. Assessing the *red* perspective is an attempt by friendly forces to understand the enemy's perspective and how he would behave under a given set of circumstances. The *blue* perspective represents the vantage and doctrinal behavior of friendly forces.

the Allies, because it was closely associated with the term *Nationalsozialist* and because it served to demonize the enemy.⁵¹ Likewise, the Communist Party originally used a standard naming scheme that coincided with the country in which they were based (i.e., the “Communist Party of [name of country]”).⁵² Hence, they were referred to as *Communists*. During the Cold War, there was no doubt when this term was used who the enemy was or the fundamental ideology which he represented.

The words *Nazi* and *Communist*, however, were not simply employed to demonize the enemy. They were reality-based terms used to frame in-depth analysis for the development of effective counterstrategies and to create unified action through focus on a common enemy. Like Coughlin suggests, the key principle in defining the enemy is a reality-based approach. He goes on to warn, however, of the dangers of mindlessly taking words the enemy uses and misapplying them through the lens of Western concepts:

One of the problems we have...is the fact that we don't fight the enemy, we fight our templates. So we hear them use words about how they define themselves, and when we do bring them in, we *redefine* them to suit our own purpose. In that, we'll take one of their terms and we'll see where it fits in our template and we'll

⁵¹Online Etymology Dictionary, word search: Nazi; available from <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?l=n&p=2>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2007. The 24th edition of *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache* (2002) says the word *Nazi* was favored in southern Germany (supposedly from c.1924) among opponents of National Socialism because the nickname *Nazi* (from the masculine proper name *Ignatz*, German form of *Ignatius*) was used colloquially to mean "a foolish person, clumsy or awkward person." *Ignatz* was a popular name in Catholic Austria, and according to one source in WWI *Nazi* was a generic name in the German Empire for the soldiers of Austria-Hungary. An older use of *Nazi* for *national-sozial* is attested in Germany from 1903, but EWdS does not think it contributed to the word as applied to Hitler and his followers. The NSDAP (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*) for a time attempted to adopt the *Nazi* designation as what the Germans call a "despite-word," but they gave this up, and the NSDAP is said to have generally avoided the term. Before 1930, party members had been called in England *National Socialists*, which dates from 1923. The use of *Nazi Germany*, *Nazi regime*, etc., was popularized by German exiles abroad. From them, it spread into other languages, and was eventually brought back to Germany, after the war. In the USSR, the terms *national socialist* and *Nazi* were said to have been forbidden after 1932, presumably to avoid any taint to the good word *socialist*.

⁵²Encyclopedia of Marxism, Glossary of Organizations, Historical Development; available from <http://marxists.architexturez.net/glossary/orgs/c/o.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2007.

adjust the definition of that term to suit our template. Then we'll message against that definition, it fires off wildly into nothingness and we have our senior leaders saying, "Well, why didn't that work?"...and it's because you are referencing yourself through your own template.⁵³

Again, this speaks of the U.S.'s mirror-imaging methodology and unwillingness to explore the ideology that supports Jihadi behavior. In this fight against *terror* there is a need for reality-based terms and definitions based upon the threat, not upon a lexicon of appeasing vernacular. The term used to describe the enemy must serve to focus friendly efforts to victory and to demonize his behavior in such a manner that it dissuades other would-be opponents from aligning with it in any fashion. For example, what regimes now associate themselves with the term *Nazi* or *Fascist*? Maximum effort and subsequent undeniable victory against the Nazi and Italian Fascist regimes have discouraged resurgence of such totalitarian states in Western Europe, and many other places, for over sixty years. Once again, Western civilization faces an ideology with tyrannical ambitions. The terminology it uses to describe it must be as clear and focused as the efforts to defeat it.

The author suggests use of the term *Jihadi*. This label has already been used extensively throughout this paper for the purpose of underscoring the significant threat faced by Western civilization and most importantly, for accuracy. There is recognition of the cultural bias associated with using the term *Jihadi* and the risk it poses in potentially empowering the enemy and his cause. However, the imperative for creating unity of effort to defeat this mounting threat is even greater. In the words of the Combating Terrorism Center's *Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report*:

We recognize that the use of "Jihadi" to designate *Salafis* of a militant stripe is controversial. Some analysts feel that it cedes too much to militant *Salafis* to

⁵³Coughlin, interview.

ratify their use of the term—they call their movement *al-haraka al-jihadiyya* ("the Jihadi Movement")—since *jihād* has positive connotations in Islam. However, we have opted to use it for the following reasons. First, it has wide currency in the Western counterterrorism community. Second, the proposed alternatives are either too imprecise or polemically charged to be analytically useful. Third, "Jihadism" indicates the centrality of religious warfare in the militant *Salafi* worldview. Fourth, using the label makes Jihadis accountable for giving the term a bad name and for not living up to the high standard of conduct associated with *jihād*. Finally, the term is used in Arab media and was coined by a devout Saudi Muslim who is hostile to the ideology, so it is not a Western neologism.⁵⁴

Jihadi also serves to bring singularity to the apparent factious nature of the enemy and therefore serves as a clear entity upon which to concentrate national effort. Jihadis have clearly described who they are and what they intend to do. Therefore, this term serves as a reality-based descriptor to begin legitimate, objective analysis.

Section Summary

As the West's emissary in the war on terrorism, the U.S. has squandered extensive time and effort trying to define an enemy who has been successful at keeping Westerners from understanding who he really is—largely due to the West's own skewed perspective. America's unwillingness to make associations between Jihadi behavior and the religion of Islam has spawned a series of irresolute descriptors that are vague, self-referencing, and reflect dissimilar understandings amongst key U.S. governmental organizations. The consequential bomb-burst of activity across these organizations has simply protracted the war on terrorism to an indefinite end. To stem the advance of its determined foe, U.S. leaders must take control of the language in this struggle by utilizing terms and definitions that are based directly upon the threat. Any other foundation for analysis is sinking sand.

⁵⁴William McCants, ed., *Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report* (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, 2006), 5; available from <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas/Atlas-ExecutiveReport.pdf>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2007.

Chapter Summary

The West's reluctance to see and fully understand the Jihadi threat facing Western society is putting multitudes at risk. Political correctness has paralyzed both the West's will and intellect. This reluctance also serves as the West's willingly-donned blindfold that helps it avoid seeing the potentially ugly truths concerning the magnitude of this threat. Jihadis have managed to use the occidental religion of political correctness as a shield to thwart any examinations of the Muslim faith itself. They have, in essence, created a double negative by coupling this untouchability with accusations of orientalism.

The failure to think critically and a lack of resolve have left Western nations engaged in a dangerous game of circular reasoning for establishing a clear definition of the enemy. The self-referencing and ambiguous terms that have shaped U.S. thinking and analysis in the war on terrorism have simply enhanced the adversary's already ghostly nature. Taking control of the language using reality-based terminology is the first step towards prompting the enemy's demise. Conversely, difficulty in defining the looming danger to Western society also speaks to the magnitude of this threat. Hoping this threat is not as big as it actually is will not make it go away. Jihadis seek to restore Islam to what they consider its purist form and to propagate their oppressive rule across the globe. As lovers and defenders of freedom, Western peoples must be willing to thoroughly examine the doctrine behind such foundational motivations and challenge the assumptions they have made regarding this ostensibly peaceful religion. Regardless of the true nature of Islam, Jihadis use it as the doctrinal basis for their global campaign. Islam therefore warrants a critical examination concerning concepts of war. For the

purpose of intellectual objectivity and examination, it is important to momentarily dismiss the idea that the West's Jihadi foes are incorrect about the true nature of Islam.

CHAPTER 2: JIHADI UNDERPINNINGS

Let us not deceive ourselves, sir. These are the implements of war and subjugation; the last arguments to which kings resort. I ask gentlemen, sir, what means this martial array, if its purpose be not to force us to submission.... We have held the subject up in every light of which it is capable; but it has been all in vain. Shall we resort to entreaty and humble supplication? What terms shall we find which have not been already exhausted? Let us not, I beseech you, sir, deceive ourselves longer.⁵⁵

*Patrick Henry
Address to the Virginia House of Burgesses, 1775*

When you see this it is just so plainly obvious you can run into trouble for not explaining it because you didn't think you needed to—it was that obvious.⁵⁶

*Stephen Coughlin
Intelligence Analyst and Author, 2006*

Chapter Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the West's self-imposed blindness to the underlying motivations of its Jihadi adversary. This chapter details some deeply embedded theological and legal precepts that underpin Jihadi conduct. These tenets, taken from sacred Sunni Islamic law and the *Qur'an*, suggest that Jihadis have neither *hijacked* nor *exploited* Islam. Such perspectives of the current situation imply that Islam contains doctrinal weaknesses that are vulnerable to being twisted to serve the political aims of some radical fringe element. In reality, the West's enemy has been able to mobilize well-grounded and rigorously authenticated Islamic precepts to legitimize its cause. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the current war on terrorism lexicon insinuates the West is combating an irrational foe that is acting outside the established rules of warfare. Examination of *their* rules, however, implies they are quite justified in their rationale to wage *jihād*.

⁵⁵Henry.

⁵⁶Coughlin, interview.

Regardless of the nature of the religion itself, the fact that Jihadis use certain Islamic precepts to legitimize their global strategy warrants an inspection of these principles as the enemy's underlying ideological motivations. Foundational to these precepts is the fact that certain rulings in Islamic sacred law and interpretations of the *Qur'an* are considered settled issues in the eyes of Sunni Muslims and not open to re-examination. These adamant judgments are based upon the incontestability of the four sources of Islamic law which are the *Qur'an*, *hadīth*, *ijma'*, and *qiyās*. These sources will be explained in more detail further on, but the reverence afforded them has established an unyielding acceptance of their long-established interpretations.

Naskh, or abrogation, is the first of these key precepts to be discussed. *Naskh* declares all previous religions null and void, which essentially establishes and legitimizes Islam as Allah's final word to all mankind. Another aspect of *naskh* says that certain parts of sacred Islamic texts abrogate, or replace, previous divine revelations and practices. This precept, in particular, influences the Jihadis' concept of the Islamic world in relation to those outside that world. In their eyes, the *dar al-Islam* (the abode of peace and Islam) has a responsibility to wage war against the *dar al-harb* (the abode of war and hostility), namely that which is non-Muslim. While *naskh* legitimizes, and the concept of *dar al-Islam* empowers, the interim goal of Jihadi activity seeks to force submission of non-Muslims to Muslim rule until the *dar al-Islam* is all that remains in the world. Lastly, this chapter will explore the basic notions of *jihād* and how it operationalizes all other Jihadi underpinnings.

Through Muslim eyes, these well-established precepts serve as a significant foothold for Jihadi legitimacy, making Islam a ready-made ideology for Jihadi conduct.

Their strict adherence to these precepts makes Jihadis predictable, and therefore vulnerable. A better understanding of these doctrinal precepts could yield such exploitable vulnerabilities, making the West's war against terrorism much less ambiguous. Though mining these Islamic tenets for exploitation is beyond the scope of this paper, their examination will potentially help reframe the West's perspective of its enemy.

Fixed Rules

Section Introduction

Unlike most Western societies that draw a distinct separation of church and state, the majority of Muslim societies rely upon a legal system that is inextricably linked to the Islamic faith. Islamic law, or *Shari'ah*, is sourced from a limited hierarchy of sacred texts and established legal practices.⁵⁷ The society's reverence for these sources has long since locked in sacred interpretations, making them largely incontestable. The union of theology and law in Islam has made it nearly impossible to challenge the law without opposing the religion itself.

This serves as a *Catch-22* for Muslims, making it extremely challenging for any type of modern reform. The four valid sources of *Shari'ah*, the *Qur'an*, *hadīth*, *ijma'*, and *qiyās*, have frozen Islamic jurisprudence because of their sacred stature. The *Qur'an*, being the holy book of Islam, is held in highest regard and serves as the most prominent contributor to *Shari'ah*. *Hadīth* share a similar status, as they capture the actions and

⁵⁷Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Qur'an: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, (Elmhurst, New York: Tahrike Tarsile *Qur'an*, 2005), 1359. *Sūra Jāthiya* 45.18. The verse reads: “Then we put thee on the (right) Way of Religion: so follow though that (Way), and follow not the desires of those who know not.” Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 4576): *Shariat* [*Shari'ah*] is best translated the ‘right way of Religion’, which is wider than the mere formal rites and legal provisions, which mostly came in the Madinah [Medinan] period, long after this Makkan [Meccan] verse had been revealed.

sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. *Ijma'*, and *qiyās* are two general types of legal rulings which align themselves in a subordinate manner to the precepts revealed in the *Qur'an* and the *hadīth*. All will be discussed in more detail further on in this section, to include their employment through a concept called *ijtihād*. Before proceeding however, this section warrants a short review of primary sources to demonstrate the scope of research presented.

Sources of Islamic Law

In order to frame the discussion that follows, it is necessary to address the span of research material with respect to the scope of this paper. Because of the voluminous nature of Islamic legal jurisprudence, the author sought a narrow band of primary sources that represent the commonalities residing within that vast array of Islamic interpretation and thought. Given that approximately 85 percent of Muslims are Sunni and that many of the lead agents in the global *jihād*, such as al-Qaeda, are Sunni-based organizations, the precepts presented in this paper represent that particular flavor of Islamic jurisprudence. Also of note is the fact that the four Sunni schools of Islamic law, Hanafi, Maliki, Shāfi'ī, and Hanbali, are identical in approximately 75 percent of their legal conclusions, thereby making Sunni Islamic law a good place to focus.⁵⁸

The primary volume used to exhibit core concepts within this body of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence is a translation of *Umdat al-Salik (The Reliance of the Traveller)* written by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri. It represents one of the finest and most reliable short works in Shāfi'ī jurisprudence, a school with perhaps fewer scholarly differences on rulings than others because its main source is the tome of Imam Nawawi, the great thirteenth-century Shāfi'ī *hadīth* scholar and jurist who upgraded the work of

⁵⁸ibn Naqib, vii.

previous generations in terms of the authenticity and application of *hadīth* evidence. ibn Naqib closely follows the order and conclusions of Nawawi's encyclopedic *al-Mamju'*: *sharh al-Muhadhdhab* (*The Compendium: An Exegesis of the "Rarification"*). *'Umdat al-Salik* is virtually an index of the conclusions of the *Mamju'* and is therefore an excellent source to retrieve the core precepts within *Shari'ah*.⁵⁹ As the translator of this work himself states:

...the authors [in] the present volume and their positions *do* represent the orthodox Muslim intellectual and spiritual heritage that has been the strength of the Community for over a thousand years, and the means through which Allah has preserved His religion, in its purest and fullest sense, to the present day.⁶⁰

Likewise, a similar source was required to address specific theological underpinnings of Jihadi conduct. The *Qur'an* itself was selected as a primary source to uncover these theological drivers. From a Muslim perspective, the *Qur'an* cannot be translated because it violates the purity of the message revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in the original Arabic language. Therefore, the author sought a longstanding English translation considered the most popular among Sunni Muslims.⁶¹ The translation of the *Qur'an* used for this paper is Abdullah Yusuf Ali's version, first published in 1934. Yusuf Ali's *The Qur'an* contains the original text, English translation, and commentary sufficient for a good exegesis of the original scripture. While this paper utilizes other sources in terms of supporting its core premise, it will rely greatly upon the works of ibn Naqib's *'Umdat al-Salik* and Yusuf Ali's *The Qur'an*.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid., viii. Italics added by author for emphasis.

⁶¹Khaleel Mohammed, "Assessing English Translations of the *Qur'an*," *The Middle East Quarterly*, 12:2, Spring 2005 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.meforum.org/article/717>; Internet; accessed 10 February 2007.

Before discussing the key precepts validated through these works it is important to establish an understanding of the fixed nature of these principles. The sources of *Shari'ah* law are deeply rooted in either sacred religious texts or cultural traditions that pre-date Islam itself. The veneration afforded these sources makes them *off-limits* with respect to reform or re-interpretation. In Islamic law, those issues which have mention in these sacred sources are less flexible based upon the clarity with which those sources speak. Those topics addressed to lesser degrees, or not at all, remain adaptable based upon the cultural realities of the day. To describe this concept, *Shari'ah* scholar Imran Ahsan Kahn Nyazee of the International Islamic University in Pakistan divides Islamic law into two spheres:

The two spheres of the law, which we may, for the sake of convenience call the “fixed” and the “flexible” spheres, are linked to each other through an organic relationship. They are not mutually dependant. In fact, it is the flexible sphere that is dependant on the fixed and unchangeable sphere, and may be said to revolve around it, changing its complexion in each age. The relationship is best described through our example of a tree. The fixed part is firmly planted in the ground, while the changing part is like the branches that spread out and keep changing their shape and appearance in different times and seasons.⁶²

From his perspective, though certain aspects of Islamic law remain *flexible*, they must still conform to those that are *fixed*. Therefore, based upon the hierarchy of the sources of Islamic law, rulings derived from a subordinate source must not violate precepts established by any higher source. By the tenth century A.D., this orderly system of Islamic law was well developed and there was no question in the legal theory that emerged as to the correct hierarchy of legal sources:

⁶²Imran Asham Khan Nyazee, *Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad*, 2d ed., (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2002), 116.

The *Qur'an* came first, at least formally and in terms of prestige and sanctity. The *sunna*, wholly represented by *hadīth*, formed the second material source of the law, followed in order of importance, by consensus [*ijma'*] and *qiyās*.⁶³

Each of these foundations will be discussed individually to provide sufficient understanding of their influence upon Islamic jurisprudence.

Incontestability of the *Qur'an*

The *Qur'an* is regarded above all other sources and serves as the cornerstone of *Shari'ah*. Its incontestability is derived from its status as the codified revelations given to the Prophet Muhammad from Allah over a period of twenty three years. For believers, it presents the words and thoughts of Allah, as recited to Muhammad, and as such is the one true and final source of all Islamic beliefs and practices.⁶⁴ While the deeds required of Muslims are captured in its Five Pillars, *Shari'ah* defines true faith in Islam as “to believe in Allah, His angels, His inspired Books, His messengers, the Last Day, and in destiny, its good and evil.”⁶⁵ With respect to the *Qur'an*, it goes on to define what it means to believe in “His inspired Books”:

To believe in *His inspired Books* means those which He revealed to His messengers, *believe* meaning to be convinced that they are the word of Allah Most High, and all they contain is the truth. (The obligation of belief applies to the original revelations, not the various scriptures in the hands of non-Muslims, which are textually corrupt in their present form.)....One is obliged to know four particular Books: (1) the *Tawrah (Torah)*, revealed to our liegelord Musa (Moses); (2) the *Injil (Evangel)*, revealed to our liegelord 'Isa (Jesus); (3) the *Zabur (Psalms)*, revealed to our liegelord Dawud (David); and the *Qur'an (Koran)*, revealed to our liegelord Muhammad (Allah bless them all and give them peace).⁶⁶

⁶³Wael B. Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 119.

⁶⁴T.P. Schwartz-Barcott, *War, Terror & Peace in the Qur'an and in Islam: Insights for Military and Government Leaders* (Carlisle, Penn.: The Army War College Press, 2004), 7.

⁶⁵Ibn Naqib, 808. Book U “The Gabriel *Hadīth*,” u2.1, “Islam.” The Five Pillars of Islam include: (1) to testify there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, (2) to perform the prayer, (3) give *zakat* [charity], (4) fast in Ramadan, and (5) perform the pilgrimage to the House [the *Kaaba* in Mecca] if you can find a way; Ibid., 809-810. Book U “The Gabriel *Hadīth*,” u3.1, “True Faith (*Iman*).”

⁶⁶Ibid., 811. Book U “The Gabriel *Hadīth*,” u3.4, “True Faith (*Iman*).”

As with all legal definitions, all words have meaning. The word “obliged” in the previous passage is no exception. The concept of *obligation* holds considerable weight in Islam, and therefore, Muslims are legally required to know and believe all that is written in the four particular books, especially the *Qur'an*.⁶⁷ To deny anything that is written in the *Qur'an* would be to risk being labeled an unbeliever—a crime for which there are strict penalties. *Shari'ah* states:

Someone raised among Muslims who denies the obligatoriness of the [Five Pillars], or denies something else upon which there is scholarly consensus (*ijma'*) and which is necessarily known as being of the religion (*necessarily known* meaning things that any Muslim would know about if asked) thereby becomes an unbeliever (*kufir*) and is executed for his unbelief (if he does not admit he is mistaken and acknowledge the obligatoriness or unlawfulness of that which there is scholarly consensus upon).⁶⁸

So, as the divinely inspired book of the Muslim faith, the incontestability of the *Qur'an* relies upon its theological sanctity and the legal obligations to adhere to everything that is written in it. This is the critical link that binds the religion to the community, making Islam a complete way of life.

Hadīth

Like the *Qur'an*, *hadīth* enjoy a sacred status because of their connection to the Prophet Muhammad. However, unlike the *Qur'an*, *hadīth* stem from a deeply rooted Arab tribal practice that long pre-dates the revelations given to Muhammad. The practice of *sunna*, the traditionally accepted behavior within a community, remained a strong cultural carry-over that fused nicely with the up-and-coming Muslim faith espoused by

⁶⁷Ibid., 30. Book C “The Nature of Legal Rulings,” c2.1, “Types of Human Act. The *obligatory* (*fard*) is that which the Lawgiver [Allah] strictly requires to be done. Someone who performs an obligatory act out of obedience to Allah is rewarded, while a person who refrains from it without excuse deserves to be punished.

⁶⁸Ibid., 109. Book F “The Prayer (*Salat*),” f1.3, “Who Must Pray.”

Muhammad and his followers. As the community of Muslim believers grew, they developed their own set of norms based largely upon the sayings and practices of the Prophet. The *hadīth* are merely the codified *sunna*s of the Prophet and his close followers. Middle Eastern historical scholar Albert Hourani describes the concept this way:

From the beginning, the community which grew up around Muhammad had a system of customary behaviour, a *sunna*, in two different senses. As a community it gradually created its own pattern of righteous behavior, developing and guaranteed by some kind of consensus. It also contained in itself people who tried to preserve the *sunna* of the Prophet, the memory of what he had done and said. His Companions would have remembered him and have handed on what they knew to the next generation. The record of his behavior and words, the *hadīth*, was passed on not only orally but in writing from an early time.⁶⁹

Though these *sunna* were eventually captured in *hadīth* form, over time they obviously became less and less proximate to the Prophet and his Companions, and thus, increasingly difficult to validate.

In time, scholars eventually catalogued these *hadīth* and developed a process of authenticating them based upon both the length and volume of linkages back to Muhammad and his original Companions. In other words, if a particular *hadīth* could be linked back through writings and key figures to its original source, it could be validated as a true *hadīth*. Higher degrees of authenticity could be granted to those *hadīth* with shorter linkages or those that linked back through multiple channels. *Hadīth* are classified by type based upon the nature of these connections but they are also distinguished by their degree of authenticity. *Shari'ah* describes this difference and also highlights which ones are obligatory to follow:

These designations [i.e., types] do not directly influence the authenticity rating of the *hadīth*, since a singular *hadīth* for example might be rigorously authenticated

⁶⁹Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 71.

(*sahih*), well authenticated (*hasan*) (...*hadīth* of both types being obligatory for a Muslim to believe in...), or not well authenticated (*da'if*), depending on the reliability ratings of the narrators and other factors weighed and judged by *hadīth* specialists.⁷⁰

More simply, the criteria for authenticity were a matter of both consensus and number of channels and stages of transmission leading back to the Prophet himself. Hourani continues:

By the use of these criteria the *hadīth* scholars were able to classify them according to their degrees of reliability. The two great collections, those of al-Bukhari [810-870 A.D.] and Muslim [c.817-875 A.D.] discarded all except those of whose truth they were sure; other collections generally regarded as having some authority were not so strict.⁷¹

This means the obligatoriness of following the *hadīth* is largely dependent upon their degree of authenticity. Those with high degrees of authenticity add to the canon of *Shari'ah* with a degree of transference that further hampers its adaptability. In the development of this canon of law, however, the increasing complexity of Islamic society revealed issues that were not explicitly covered by the sacred texts of the *Qur'an* and *hadīth*.

Ijma'

To fill these gaps, Muslims turned to an age-old tradition with which they were very familiar—consensus. Scholarly consensus, or *ijma'* was born out of the notion of community agreement which had served as the foundation of communal behavior for thousands of years before Islam ever came on the scene. As Islam asserted itself, *ijma'* nested nicely with Muslim culture, establishing this ancient practice as an authoritative source for Islamic jurisprudence:

⁷⁰ibn Naqib, 627. Book 0 “Justice,” o22.1, “The Judge and the Court.”

⁷¹Hourani, 71.

The growth in the religious values and impulse of Islam, coupled with the development of technical legal thought, produced—as part of the theoretical sophistication of Islamic jurisprudence—the need to justify what came to be considered “secondary sources of the law, sources that did not directly issue from the Divine. Consensus, originating in pre-Islamic Arab tribal conduct, was one of these. By the middle of the...eighth century [A.D.], it had inextricably merged with the sunnaic practices of various Muslim communities, thus acquiring a religious character.”⁷²

Shari'ah defines *ijma'* as “the agreement of all the *mujtahids* of the Muslims existing at one particular period after the Prophet’s death (Allah bless him and give him peace) about a particular ruling regarding a matter or event.”⁷³

Though *ijma'* is a powerful concept based upon its cultural foundations, in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, it must still remain subordinate to divinely inspired texts. Says Wael Hallaq, professor of Islamic law at McGill University’s Institute of Islamic Studies:

Consensus [*ijma'*]...must rest on revealed texts, and if these texts contain no evidence of abrogation, then consensus cannot decide the matter. Consensus, in other words, cannot go beyond the evidence of the texts, for it is only the texts that determine whether or not one ruling can abrogate another.⁷⁴

Part of the process for developing scholarly consensus, then, was a careful review of the *Qur'an* and *hadīth*. *Mujtahids* first had to ensure the issue was not already addressed in divine guidance, thus making any debate on the subject moot. *Ijma'* also had to guarantee conformity to sacred texts with regard to established interpretations and exegesis.

This natural tension made it extremely difficult to invoke the process of *ijma'* and to substantiate a final ruling. Strict criteria had to be met in order to certify the scholarly consensus of the *mujtahids*, the most important of which was unanimous agreement. Once the integrals of consensus existed, the ruling became an authoritative part of sacred

⁷²Hallaq, 112.

⁷³ibn Naqib, 23. Book B “The Validity of Following Scholarly Scholarship,” b7.1 “Scholarly Consensus (*Ijma'*)”; Ibid., 16. Book B “The Validity for Following Qualified Leadership,” b1.1, “Introduction.” A *mujtahid* is defined as one who is qualified to issue expert legal opinion.

⁷⁴Hallaq, 137.

law that was obligatory to obey. Most importantly, *Shari'ah* also dictates that *mujtahids* of a succeeding period cannot revisit a decision to invoke new *ijma'* on the same topic. The ruling, “verified by strictly administered scholarly consensus, is an absolute legal ruling which does not admit of being contravened or annulled.”⁷⁵ Once again, this demonstrates the *fixed* nature of classic Islamic law. Though *ijma'* is subordinate to the divine texts, it carries the echoing authority of highly revered Muslim scholars into perpetuity.

Qiyās

Much like *ijma'*, *qiyās* also serves as a secondary material source for Islamic sacred law. As the fourth and final source, *qiyās* is most simply defined as rulings using analogical reasoning.⁷⁶ This concept, somewhat akin to *precedent* in Western law, was evoked when the *Qur'an* or *hadīth* offered no guidance on a specific issue but did provide divine directive on a related topic. Wael Hallaq offers the following definition for *qiyās*:

...a legal rule resulting—with regard to a case unstipulated in the revealed texts—from a meaning that constitutes the *ratio* for a legal rule stipulated in the texts.

Now, the most common and important form of reasoning that is generally subsumed under the term *qiyās* is analogy.⁷⁷

For example, if the *Qur'an* had a particular ruling on the consumption of a specific type of alcohol, such as grape wine, through analogical reasoning it can be inferred it is also inappropriate to consume hard liquor due to its similar intoxicating effects. Once again, *qiyās* had to remain subordinate to the divine sources of Islamic law and conform to their overall intent. Therefore, much like *ijma'*, *qiyās* was a strictly controlled process for developing *Shari'ah* law. Overall, however, the inherent inflexibility of *Shari'ah* lies

⁷⁵Ibn Naqīb, 23-24. Book B “The Validity for Following Qualified Leadership,” b7.1-b7.2, “Scholarly Consensus (*Ijma'*).”

⁷⁶Ibid., 628. Book O “Justice,” o22.1, “The Judge and the Court.”

⁷⁷Hallaq, 141.

within all four of its approved sources, the *Qur'an*, *hadīth*, *ijma'*, and *qiyās*. Furthermore, sacred Islamic law cemented its authority by *operationalizing* these sources through the actual process of legal reasoning.

Ijtihad

This process of expert legal reasoning on matters of sacred law is called *ijtihad*.⁷⁸ Being qualified to perform *ijtihad* requires knowledge of the rules and principles of the *Qur'an*, *hadīth*, *ijma'*, and *qiyās*, together with knowing the types of each of these. Those qualified, the *mujtahids*, not only had to possess absolute knowledge of these rules and principles, but they had to understand their application for giving correct judgments in court.⁷⁹ Their divine authority for conducting *ijtihad* comes from empowering verses in the *Qur'an*:

*And before thee also the apostles We sent were but men, to whom we granted inspiration: if ye realize this not, ask of those who possess the Message.*⁸⁰

*Qur'an 16:43
Third Meccan Period Revelation*

ibn Naqib, in his *'Umdat al-Salik*, describes how Islamic scholars employed *ijma'* to create a circular justification for their own authority using this particular verse:

By consensus of all scholars (*ijma'*), this verse is an imperative for someone who does not know a ruling in Sacred law or the evidence for it to follow someone who does. Virtually all scholars of fundamentals of Islamic law have made this verse their principle evidence that it is obligatory for the ordinary person to follow the scholar who is a *mujtahid*.⁸¹

Likewise, he highlights the obligatory nature of following the rulings of the *mujtahids*:

⁷⁸ibn Naqib, 16. Book B "The Validity for Following Qualified Leadership," b1.1. "Introduction."

⁷⁹Ibid., 625-629. Book O "Justice," o22.1, "The Judge and the Court."

⁸⁰Yusuf Ali, 667. *Sūra Nahl* 16.43. Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 2069): "Those who possess the Message" may mean any men of wisdom, who were qualified to have an opinion in such matters (e.g., *mujtahids*).

⁸¹ibn Naqib, 17. Book B "The Validity for Following Qualified Leadership," b2.1, "The Koranic Evidence for Following Scholars."

...when those of authority in legal expertise, the *mujtahids*, agree upon a ruling, it is obligatory in the very words of the *Qur'an* to follow them and carry out their judgment.⁸²

The verse he refers to is *Qur'an* 4:59 which states:

*O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you.*⁸³

*Qur'an 4:59
Medinan Period Revelation*

These qur'anic verses are used as evidence for following scholars and their rulings. The relatively seamless gap between secular and sacred affairs in Islam allows those "charged with authority" to grant their own legal legitimacy, locking in their rulings for posterity using the irrevocable process of *ijtihad*.

Ijtihad was not always so conclusive, however. Upon Muhammad's death there arose a debate among Muslims as to who should succeed the Prophet. Some said it should be the Prophet's younger son-in-law and cousin, Ali. Others felt the reins should be passed to his elder companion Abu Bakr. This debate precipitated the first major split in Islam, resulting in the Shia ("Faction of Ali") and the Sunni (followers of the *sunna*, or tradition) sects. Muslim journalist and activist Irshad Manji relates how this split eventually resulted in a cessation of critical thought:

For about 275 years, that division [i.e., the Shia-Sunni split] simmered. It flared up with a vengeance in 909 A.D., when a splinter group of Shias proclaimed a separate government within the Sunni-led Islamic empire.... Within a few generations, Baghdad oversaw the closing of... the gates of *ijtihad* and therefore the tradition of independent thought. In the guise of protecting the worldwide

⁸²Ibid., 24. Book B "The Validity of Following Scholarly Scholarship," b7.3, "Scholarly Consensus (*Ijma'*)."

⁸³Yusuf Ali, 198. *Sûra Nisâa* 4.59. Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 580): *Ulu-l-amr*: Those charged with authority or responsibility or decision, or the settlement of affairs. All ultimate authority rests in God. Men of God derive their authority from Him.

Muslim nation from disunity (known as *fitna* and considered a crime), Baghdad-approved scholars formed a consensus to freeze debate within Islam.⁸⁴

For the sake of protecting the Islamic empire, the *mujtahids* sealed their own fate and closed the doors of *ijtihad*. Manji goes on to describe how the right of independent thinking subsequently became the exclusive privilege of the *mufti*, the lawyer-priest, in each city or state—a practice that continues to this day.⁸⁵ From her perspective, this end to critical thinking locked in a legal code constructed during the days of Islamic empire.⁸⁶ Unfortunately, this code has been mechanically imitated ever since.

Section Summary

The symbiotic relationship of theological and legal precepts has made Islamic jurisprudence extremely inflexible. Reverence for the four sacred sources of Islamic law, the *Qur'an*, *hadīth*, *ijma'*, and *qiyās*, legitimizes what is codified within *Shari'ah*, essentially creating a self-reinforcing system of jurisprudence. Because theological and legal precepts endorse each other, it is impossible to reform Islamic law without contradicting the religion—and it is likewise impossible to reform the religion without contradicting Islamic law. The laws in the *Qur'an* and the *hadīth*, have been determined and fixed for all times to come. They comprise the core legal concepts, the genetic code, so to speak. Because the secondary sources of Islamic law, the *ijma'* and *qiyās*, must obey this genetic code, they too are largely immutable. Calls for *ijtihad* in the present age, if they are meant to alter such fixed laws, are futile and unnecessary.⁸⁷

The systemic paralysis of self-reinforcement complements the lack of critical thought by Muslims regarding precepts within the Islamic world. This lack of challenge

⁸⁴Manji, 72.

⁸⁵Ibid., 73.

⁸⁶Ibid., 73-74.

⁸⁷Nyazee, *Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad*, 111.

has provided an open door for Jihadis and has allowed them to employ *Shari'ah* to legitimize their actions in their global *jihād*. Regardless of their actual legitimacy, the fact that Jihadis are using *Shari'ah* to justify themselves, with the ultimate objective of establishing it globally, merits a look at some of these *fixed* baseline precepts.

Naskh

Section Introduction

To begin this examination it is important to first examine how Islam sees itself in relation to all other faiths. No religion could sustain itself if it did not contain some type of self-legitimizing design. This could take many forms such as the claimed fulfillment of prophecy, the promise of internal peace and harmony, spiritual reward in the afterlife, or a final revelation from a divine source, etc. For Islam, the religion legitimizes itself as the final revelation from Allah to his people through the Prophet Muhammad. Through Muslim eyes, Islam has therefore nullified all other religions. This concept is known by multiple terms, namely, abrogation, supersession, or in Arabic, *naskh*. In essence, Islam abrogates, or abolishes by higher authority, the efficacy of all other religious belief systems.

Not only does Islam employ this concept of *naskh* to establish itself as the only valid religion, it is also inherent to the faith itself. Within Islam, *naskh* is applied with respect to the chronology of divine revelations given to the Prophet Muhammad. In other words, subsequent revelations captured as scripture in the *Qur'an* can abrogate preceding verses, essentially making the more recent revelations Allah's final direction to his people regarding particular issues. In terms of what these later revelations require of the Islamic community, this progressive revelation becomes extremely significant to the

West regarding matters such as *jihād* and relations with non-Muslims. A detailed analysis goes beyond the depth of this discussion, however, a general understanding of how *naskh* is applied with regard to other religions and to Islam itself will yield a better appreciation for how Jihadis use this well-established doctrine to legitimize their outlook towards non-Muslims.

Null and Void

Like most other religions, Islam proclaims itself to be perfect guidance on how to live a holy life subordinate to a divine entity. It has declared itself the “Religion of Truth” that was revealed to replace all other religions. Such recurring evidence is apparent in the following examples from the *Qur'an*:

It is He Who hath sent His Apostle with Guidance and the Religion of Truth, [that He may] proclaim it over all religion, even though the Pagans may detest (it).⁸⁸

*Qur'an 9:33 and 61:8-9
Medinan Period Revelation*

It is He Who has sent His Apostle with Guidance and the Religion of Truth, to proclaim it over all religion: and enough is God for a Witness.⁸⁹

*Qur'an 48:28
Medinan Period Revelation*

Shari'ah has taken such qur'anic guidance and affirmed the concept of *naskh*, thereby negating the legitimacy of other religions through legal precepts:

Allah Most High sent Muhammad (Allah bless him and give him peace), the Qurayshite unlettered prophet, to deliver His inspired message to the entire world,

⁸⁸Yusuf Ali, 449. *Sūra Tauba* 9.33.; *Ibid.*, 1541. *Sūra* 61.9 *Saff*. Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 5442): “*Over all religion*”: in the singular: not over all other religions, in the plural. There is really only one true Religion, the Message of God, submission to the Will of God: this is called Islam. It was the religion preached by Moses and Jesus; it was the religion of Abraham, Noah, and all the prophets, by whatever name it may be called. If people corrupt the pure light, and call their religions by different names, we must bear with them and we may allow the names for convenience. But Truth must prevail over all.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 1399-1400. *Sūra* 48.28 *Fat-h*.

Arabs and non-Arabs, *jinn* and mankind, superseding and abrogating all previous religious systems with the Prophet's Sacred Law...⁹⁰

To embolden Muslims, the verses also promise resistance from non-Muslims by stating “the Pagans may detest (it)” —the *it* being the greater light of Islam that will outshine all lesser lights.⁹¹ Granted, such self-endorsement is to be expected of a major religion.

Islam, however, uses a unique tactic to delegitimize opposing faiths. Islam actually embraces the other Abrahamic religions, including Judaism, Christianity, and a few others, but declares them to be *obsolete* and *corrupt* versions of Islam. Renowned Islamic scholar and professor, Dr. John Esposito, speaks to how Islam was able to subtly usurp these other religions in the eyes of its followers:

The *Qur'an* itself identifies Jews and Christians as the recipients of earlier revealed books or scripture, namely the *Torah*, the *Psalms*, and the *Gospel*. These scriptures are believed to have been corrupted by the communities to which they were sent and are thus abrogated and in some sense superseded by the *Qur'an*. They are nonetheless held in esteem insofar as they were originally God's revelation, and the peoples to whom they were given are thus considered in a special category, namely the People of the Book.⁹²

Here, it is important to distinguish that what was held in high esteem were the previous revelations from Allah, not *the People of the Book* who believed in those original revelations. Remember that part of *true faith in Islam* requires Muslims to know and believe in four of Allah's inspired books: the *Tawrah* (*Torah*), revealed to the Prophet Musa (Moses), the *Injil* (*Evangel*) [also referred to as the *Gospel*], revealed to the Prophet 'Isa (Jesus), the *Zabur* (*Psalms*), revealed to the Prophet Dawud (David), and the *Qur'an*, revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. *Shari'ah* goes on to state that, “The obligation of

⁹⁰Ibn Naqib, 822. Book V “Allah and His Messenger,” v2.1, “His Messenger.”

⁹¹Yusuf Ali, 449. *Sūra Tauba* 9.33. Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 1290): Every religion which commends itself widely to human beings and lasts through some space of time has a glimpse of Truth in it. But Islam is the perfect light of Truth. As the greater Light, through its own strength, outshines all lesser lights, so will Islam outshine all else, in spite of the displeasure of those to whom light is an offense.; Ibid., 1541. *Sūra* 61.9 *Saff*.

⁹²John L. Esposito, *The Oxford History of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 306.

belief applies to the *original revelations*, not the various scriptures in the hands of non-Muslims, which are textually corrupt in their present form.”⁹³ This would suggest that even those religions which share a common heritage with Islam, and given special consideration within *Shari'ah*, are now considered null and void.

In her work, *Qur'anic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis*, Dr. Jane Dammen McAuliffe describes *naskh* and its nullifying effect on other religions. In her book, she uses the term *salvific stages*, rather than *naskh* or abrogation, to showcase the imperative to adhere to the most recent version of Allah's guidance:

...al-Tabarī amplifies the *hadīth*'s message by explaining the various stages of revelation throughout history. He begins with Jews, whose duty it was to follow the *Torah* and the “practice (*sunna*)” of Moses. This obligation prevailed, however, only during the period following God's revelation to Moses until His revelation to Jesus. After this new divine disclosure, the Jews are under the obligation to follow the *Gospel (Injīl)* and the laws of Jesus. Whoever does not is doomed to perish (*hālik*). Similarly is Christian observance related to the inauguration of the Islamic era. Belief in Jesus and what was revealed to him is only acceptable until the coming of Muhammad. Then “whoever does not follow Muhammad and renounce his adherence to the *sunna* of Jesus and the *Injīl* is damned.”⁹⁴

This threat of damnation is more than just some eschatological promise from Allah regarding one's salvation from eternity in hell. *Shari'ah* remains very clear on the concept of *naskh* and the fate of those unwilling to convert to Islam. Practitioners of other faiths are labeled as unbelievers, or *kufir*, and face dire penalties, to be described in more detail later in this chapter.

⁹³ibn Naqib, 811. Book U “The Gabriel Hadith,” u3.4, “True Faith (Iman).” Italics added by author for emphasis.

⁹⁴Jane Damman McAuliffe, *Qur'anic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 111.

Careful examination of the following passage from the *‘Umdat al-Salik* illustrates the deeply rooted concept of *naskh* and how *Shari'ah* has preempted any challenge to its validity by those espousing “erroneous theories”:

Previously revealed religions were valid in their own eras, as is attested to by many verses of the *Holy Qur'an*, but were abrogated by the universal message of Islam, as is equally attested to by many verses of the *Qur'an*. [This point is] worthy of attention from English-speaking Muslims, who are occasionally exposed to erroneous theories advanced by some teachers and *Qur'an* translators affirming these religions' validity but denying or not mentioning their abrogation, or that it is unbelief (*kufir*) to hold that the remnant cults now bearing the names of formerly valid religions, such as “Christianity” or “Judaism,” are acceptable to Allah Most High after He has sent the final Messenger (Allah bless him give him peace) to the entire world. This is a matter over which there is no disagreement among Islamic scholars...⁹⁵

The fact that this passage evokes the concept of *ijma'* by stating “there is no disagreement among Islamic scholars...,” freezes any debate about this notion and fortifies its legitimacy as a core Islamic principle.

On this level, the claim of abrogating other religions empowers Islam and those who would use it to endorse their strategic objectives. However, a deeper, internal application of *naskh* serves to legitimize their cause even more. The fact that Allah's divine guidance to Muhammad was revealed in stages lends itself to abrogation and the selective application of this guidance with respect to non-Muslims.

Progressive Revelation

This selective application is by no means unauthorized by the *Qur'an* or the religion as a whole, however. It is, in fact, a logical application of *naskh* coupled with the progressive revelations given to Muhammad in four distinct periods during his life as a prophet of Allah. During these periods, the First Meccan, Second Meccan, Third Meccan, and the Medinan, Muhammad is reported to have received specific guidance to

⁹⁵ibn Naqib, 846. Book W “Notes and Appendices,” w4.1, “The Finality of the Prophet's Message.”

meet the Muslim community's changing circumstances. The guidance received, then, reflects the character of each period and the requirements necessary to sustain and expand the *Ummah*. In applying *naskh* to these progressive stages of revelation, Muslims interpret the revelations and *hadīth* of the last period, the Medinan, as the final word from Allah regarding particular issues. This final word is considered an expiration point for any previous guidance on particular matters and becomes the new imperative to follow for all Muslims. Though at first glance many scriptures in the *Qur'an* appear to be contradictory, when viewed in the light of progressive revelation it becomes much easier to understand the final intent of Islam's most holy book. Better knowledge of these final revelations and the nature of this period render a more focused understanding of the Jihadis' claims to legitimacy.

Many verses throughout the *Qur'an* speak to progressive revelation, making it a well-accepted and foundational concept in Islam. Muslims use verses such as 2:106 and 17:106 as core scripture to justify this notion:

*None of Our revelations do We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or similar: knowest thou not that God hath power over all things?*⁹⁶

*Qur'an 2:106
Medinan Period Revelation*

*(It is) a Qur'an which We have divided (into parts from time to time), in order that thou mightest recite it to men at intervals: We have revealed it by stages.*⁹⁷

*Qur'an 17:106
Second Meccan Period Revelation*

Yusuf Ali's commentary on each of these verses reveals how *naskh* not only annuls previous religions, but how it can be applied to abrogate prior revelations in the *Qur'an*:

⁹⁶Yusuf Ali, 46-47. *Súra Baqarah* 2.106.

⁹⁷Ibid., 725. *Súra Bani Isrá-íl* 17.106.

If we take it in a general sense, it means that God's message from age to age is always the same, but that its form may differ according to the needs and exigencies of the time. That form was different as given to Moses and then to Jesus and then to Muhammad. Some commentators apply it also to the *Áyāt* [revelations] of the *Qur'an*. There is nothing derogatory in this if we believe in progressive revelation.⁹⁸

The marvel is that these parts, revealed at different times and in different circumstances, should fit together so closely and consistently as they do. All revelation is progressive. The previous revelations were also progressive. Each of them marked a stage in the world's spiritual history.⁹⁹

Though he suggests some differences on the application of *naskh* to the revelations of the *Qur'an*, the differences that exist between the schools of Islamic law have more to do with which verses abrogate and which are abrogated. Regardless, *naskh* remains a widely accepted premise for Islam.

In his book *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*, Wael Hallaq affirms this accepted practice of weighing the validity of qur'anic verses and *hadīth* against previous versions based upon their chronological impartation. He writes:

The epistemological strength of texts also plays a central role in abrogation. A text deemed presumptive or probable cannot repeal another having the quality of certitude. On the other hand, texts that are considered of equal epistemological value may abrogate one another. This principle derives from *Qur'an* 2:106 which speaks of abrogating verses and replacing them by similar or "better" ones. Hence, qur'anic verses, like recurrent *hadīth*, can repeal each other.¹⁰⁰

Furthering this concept, *Shari'ah* also acknowledges progressive revelation and the abrogation of previously revealed verses. One of the many necessary qualifications listed within *Shari'ah* for being an Islamic judge is to possess "knowledge of the rules and principles of the *Qur'an*." This includes knowledge

⁹⁸Ibid., 46. *Sūra Baqarah* 2.106. See Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 107).

⁹⁹Ibid., 725. *Sūra Bani Isrā'il* 17.106. See Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 2317).

¹⁰⁰Hallaq, 137.

of those verses “which supersede previously revealed qur’anic verses”¹⁰¹ Nyazee

also describes the unanimous acceptance of abrogation by the four schools of

Sunni law:

All four Sunni schools unanimously accept the doctrine of abrogation, though they may disagree on the details. Most of the independent jurists also accepted this doctrine. It may, therefore, be assumed to be a kind of consensus. The concept of “repeal” and “overriding laws” is a necessity in a legal system and Islamic law acknowledges it. Such repeal in the [sacred] texts, though, could only occur during the lifetime of the Prophet (peace be unto him), that is, abrogation where claimed comes from the Lawgiver, it is not the work of the jurists.¹⁰²

The important point here is the fact that again, *ijma'*, or consensus, is evoked to lock in the interpretation of *naskh* and how it applies to the Prophet’s revelations. Changes to Allah’s divine law for Muslims were only granted during Muhammad’s lifetime. These changes, however, are considered part of the divine discourse between Allah and the honored Prophet Muhammad, and therefore further establish the validity of progressive revelation.

Understanding Islam requires an understanding of progressive revelation and the nature of each of the four periods of Allah’s revelations to his last prophet. Arguably, dividing these revelations into the four periods is but one framework for understanding the internal application of *naskh* to the *Qur'an* and *hadīth*. However, the work of nineteenth-century Islamic scholar Theodor Nöldeke remains one of the most important contributions to the study of qur’anic chronology. Nöldeke divided Muhammad’s career into four distinct periods which he labeled First Meccan, Second Meccan, Third Meccan, and the Medinan (see Fig. 1). He was not only able to categorize the books of the *Qur'an* using references to known historical events, but acknowledged the character of each

¹⁰¹ibn Naqib, 626. Book O “Justice,” o22.0, “The Judge and the Court.”

¹⁰²Imran Asham Khan Nyazee, *Islamic Jurisprudence* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2003), 318.

Chronology of the *Qur'an*

European attempts to work out the chronological order of the *Suras* [books of the *Qur'an*] have usually taken internal evidence into account as well, that is, apparent references to known public events, especially during the Medinan period of Muhammad's career. Attention has also been paid to considerations of style, vocabulary and the like. In short, the *Qur'an* has been subjected to severe scrutiny according to the methods of modern literary and historical criticism.

Several nineteenth-century scholars made useful contributions to the study of qur'anic chronology; but the most important book by far was Theodor Nöldeke's *Geschichte des Qor'ans*, first published in 1860. A second edition, revised and enlarged by Friedrich Schwally and others, appeared in three volumes in 1909, 1919 and 1938, and was reprinted by a photocopying process in 1961. In respect of chronology, Nöldeke assumed a progressive change of style from exalted poetical passages in the early years to long prosaic deliverances later. He followed the Islamic tradition in recognizing a division into *Suras* mainly revealed at Mecca and those mainly revealed at Medina, but further divided the Meccan *Suras* into three periods.

The *Suras* of the First Meccan Period are mostly short. The verses also are short, and the language rhythmic and full of imagery. Groups of oaths often occur at the beginning of passages. The *Suras* of this period, in the order assigned to them by Nöldeke are: 96, 74, 111, 106, 108, 104, 107, 102, 105, 92, 90, 94, 93, 97, 86, 91, 80, 68, 87, 95, 103, 85, 73, 101, 99, 82, 81, 53, 84, 100, 79, 77, 78, 88, 89, 75, 83, 69, 51, 52, 56, 70, 55, 112, 109, 113, 114, 1.

In the Second Meccan Period there is a transition from the sublime enthusiasm of the first period to the greater calmness of the third. The fundamental teaching is supported and explained by numerous illustrations from nature and history. There are also discussions of some doctrinal points. In particular emphasis is placed on the signs of God's power both in nature and in the events which befell former prophets. The latter are described in a way which brings out their relevance to what was happening to Muhammad and his followers. Stylistically, the period is distinguished by new modes of speech. Oaths are seldom used. The *Suras* grow longer and frequently have formal introductions, such as: "This is the revelation of God..." Passages are often preceded by "Say," as a command to Muhammad. God is frequently referred to as, "the Merciful". The *Suras* of the period are: 54, 37, 71, 76, 44, 50, 20, 26, 15, 19, 38, 36, 43, 72, 67, 23, 21, 25, 17, 27, 18.

In the Third Meccan Period the use of ["the Merciful"] as a proper name ceases, but other characteristics of the second period are intensified. The prophetic stories are frequently repeated with slight variations of emphasis. The *Suras* of this period are: 32, 41, 45, 16, 30, 11, 14, 12, 40, 28, 39, 29, 31, 42, 10, 34, 35, 7, 46, 6, 13.

The *Suras* of the Medinan Period show not so much a change of style as a change of subject. Since the Prophet is now recognized as such by a whole community, the revelations contain laws and regulations for the community. Often the people are directly addressed. Some contemporary events are mentioned and their significance made clear. The *Suras* of the period are: 2, 98, 64, 62, 8, 47, 3, 61, 57, 4, 65, 59, 33, 63, 24, 58, 22, 48, 66, 60, 110, 49, 9, 5.

Fig. 1. Chronology of the *Qur'an*. Reprinted from Richard Bell, *Bell's Introduction to the Qur'an*, rev. Montgomery Watt (Edinburgh: University Press, 1953), Chapter 7 [book on-line]; available from <http://www.truthnet.org/islam/Watt/Chapter7.html>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007.

phase based upon the subject matter with respect to the status of the *Ummah* during each period. Dr. Mark Durie, noted Australian scholar of comparative theology, offers the following explanation for the characterization of each period of revelation:

The classical consensus was that the revelations regulating relations with non-Muslims evolved in accordance with the development of Muhammad's prophetic career. At the beginning, when Muhammad was weaker and his followers few, the revelations encouraged peaceful relations and avoidance of conflict. Then, after persecution and emigration to Medina in the first year of the Islamic calendar, authority was given to engage in warfare for defensive purposes only. As the Muslim community steadily grew stronger, and conflict with its neighbours did not abate, further revelations expanded the license for waging war. Finally, in *Súra* 9, regarded as the last to be revealed, it was concluded that war against non-Muslims could be waged, virtually at any time and in any place, to extend the dominance of Islam. This resulted in an aggressive theory of *jihād* which is well documented in medieval manuals of *Shari'ah* law.¹⁰³

This suggests the imperative for Muslims to wage *jihād* was contingent upon their capacity to do so. Given that the characterization of the Medinan period was jihadist and expansionist in nature, and considered to be the *final guidance* from Allah regarding the obligations of Islam, it warrants examination as a legitimizing source for Jihadi conduct in the world today. Tying the concept of *naskh* to progressive revelation, Stephen Coughlin points out, "Abrogation of previously valid religions is a doctrinal fact of Islam....losing their status as valid religions qualifies its members as specific targets of *jihād*."¹⁰⁴

Section Summary

The message to Muslims is that unbelievers will not understand the concept of progressive revelation. The *Qur'an* states:

¹⁰³Mark Durie, "Witness Statement of Mark John Durie" (Melbourn, Australia: Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, 03 October 2003); available from http://www.saltshakers.org.au/pdf/313278_VCAT_-_DOCUMENTS_RELATIN.pdf; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007. A *Súra* is a book of the *Qur'an*.

¹⁰⁴Coughlin, "To Our Great Detriment: Never Considering the Jihadis May Be Right About Islamic Law," 113.

When We substitute one revelation for another,—and God knows best what he reveals (in stages),—they say, “Thou art but a forger” but most of them understand not.¹⁰⁵

*Qur'an 16:101
Third Meccan Period Revelation*

Indeed, this seems to be the case, as the West has been largely ignorant of this foundational Islamic principle. The general nature of each of the four revelations echoes the relative attributes of the Muslim community during each of the four unique periods. Applying *naskh* to the staged revelations suggests that the nature and divine guidance of the offensive and expansionist Medinan period would prevail as the final word from Allah on matters regarding non-Muslims. Therefore, examination of Jihadi conduct in light of *naskh* and progressive revelation should be the starting point for understanding the true nature of the enemy.

Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Harb

Section Introduction

For both the East and the West, the Cold War offered a bipolar worldview that drove powerful nations to vie for global dominance and prepare for massive wars of annihilation. The standoff between communism and democracy-based capitalism framed the thinking of the global citizenry and served as the dominant undercurrent of all world politics. Though the Cold War ended, a similar bipolar worldview has existed in the minds of Muslims since the establishment of Islam. Muslims divide the world into two categories, the *dar al-Islam* (the abode of peace and Islam) and the *dar al-harb* (the

¹⁰⁵Yusuf Ali, 684. *Sûra Nahll* 16:101. Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 2140): The doctrine of progressive revelation from age to age and time to time does not mean that God's fundamental Law changes. It is not fair to charge a Man of God with forgery because the Message as revealed to him is in a different form from that revealed before, when the core of the Truth is the same, for it comes from God.

abode of war and hostility)—or more simply, that which is Muslim and that which is non-Muslim. It is this bipolar worldview that is used to distinguish between Muslim lands and enemy lands and the governing relationships between them. In their eyes, it is the responsibility of the *dar al-Islam* to wage war against the *dar al-harb* in order to open the world to Islam, for it is the latter which serves as an impediment to the ultimate peace of an Islamic world. This bipolar perspective has framed Muslim thinking from the time of Muhammad's conquests at Medina, essentially creating a longstanding clash of civilizations.

Two Worlds

Though this clash has both surged and recoiled throughout the course of Islamic history, it has been an ever present force within the *Ummah*. Categorizing the world into the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb* was not just a means of creating a black-and-white perspective on the concepts of peace and war. This concept permeates *all* aspects of Muslim life, creating an individual understanding that the *dar al-Islam* is that which is Muslim and that the *dar al-harb* is that which is non-Muslim. Dr. John Esposito shares the following:

It was at once projected upon Islam and expected of it, fostered in the awareness that Muslims understood the world to be divided into what they termed “the abode of Islam” and that which is not Muslim, namely “the abode of war.”¹⁰⁶

Using this understanding, all that is not Muslim becomes the abode, or residence, of war. Therefore, the *dar al-Islam* is in a perpetual state of war with the *dar al-harb*. In his translation of classical Islamic jurist Shaybani's *Siyar*, Majid Khadduri explains this perpetual state of conflict:

¹⁰⁶Esposito, 324.

The *dar-al Islam*, in theory was in a state of war with the *dar al-harb*, because the ultimate objective of Islam was the whole world. If the *dar al-harb* were reduced by Islam, the public order or Pax Islamica would supersede all others, and non-Muslim communities would either become part of the Islamic community or submit to its sovereignty as tolerated religious communities or as autonomous entities possessing treaty relations with it.¹⁰⁷

Here it can be seen how the concept of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* intertwines with *naskh*, or the abrogation of all other religions. Overlaying these two concepts establishes the imperative and the justification for Islam to bring war to all that is not Muslim because of its professed supremacy to all other religions. Naturally, non-Muslim entities were not willing to submit to the encroachments of the *dar al-Islam* and took protective measures to preserve their own sovereignty.

In the absence of enough offensive power to overcome territories of the *dar al-harb*, the Islamic community developed other categories of relations in order to preserve the dignity of the *dar al-Islam*. The community was willing to accept a *temporary* condition of peace with a non-Muslim territory while it grew and extended its power base in other areas. A description of this temporary state of peace follows:

...an important variation to the Islamic dichotomization of the world into *dar al-Islam* (world of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (world of war) occurred under the Shāfi'is [one of the four Sunni schools of *Shari'ah*]. They devised a third category, *dar al-Sulh* (world of peace) or *dar al-ahd* (world of covenant) that gives “*qualified*” recognition to a non-Muslim state if it entered into treaty relations with Islam either before hostilities began or after offering stiff resistance, on condition that the non-Muslim state should either pay an annual tribute, a poll tax (*jizya*) or ceded a portion of its territory. Thus in some Islamic law, a formal condition of peace is a *temporary* way station between Muslim states and non-Muslim states, without military battle or conflict, while the Muslim states arrange to extend *dar al-Islam* throughout the world.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 13.

¹⁰⁸Schwartz-Barcott, 282. Italics added by author for emphasis.

Other variations on Islamic international relations suggest that the *dar al-Islam* might still be able to maintain its prominence without fighting by simply not granting legal recognition of the *dar al-harb*. Khadurri explains:

The state of war existing between the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb*, however, does not necessarily mean that actual hostilities must occur. Whenever fighting came to an end, the state of war was reduced to a situation equivalent under the modern law of nations as a state of non-recognition. Strictly speaking, it meant that the *dar al-harb* was denied legal status under Islamic law as long as it failed to conform to Islam's legal and ethical standards or to attain the status of the tolerated religious communities.¹⁰⁹

The *dar al-Islam* versus *dar al-harb* outlook is the foundation of the Islamic conception of world order. This not only has implications for occidentalism, i.e., what Muslims think of the West, but for the territorial aims of the *dar al-Islam*.

Enemy Lands

This territorial aspect of the *dar al-Islam* has to do both with the national identity of Muslims and the distinction between Muslim and enemy lands. Egyptian intellectual and Islamist Sayyid Qutb suggests that Muslims possess no nationality other than the *dar al-Islam*. In his classic work *Milestones* he writes:

There is only one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam (*dar al-Islam*), and it is that place where the Islamic state is established and the *Shari'ah* is the authority and God's limits are observed, and where all the Muslims administer the affairs of the state with mutual consolation. The rest of the world is the home of hostility (*dar-al-harb*). ...A Muslim has no country except that part of the earth where the *Shari'ah* of God is established and human relationships are based on the foundation of relationship with God; a Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a member of the Muslim community in *dar al-Islam*; a Muslim has no relatives except those who share the belief in God and thus a bond is established between him and other believers through their relationship with God.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹Khadduri, 14.

¹¹⁰Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (New Delhi: New Johar Offset Press, 1981), 118-119.

Qutb speaks to the purity required of a true Islamic state—one that must remain true to Islamic precepts and purge itself of all that is non-Muslim. It is this pure state of Islam to which all Muslims owe their allegiance, not the nation-state in which they live. From a territorial perspective, Qutb's statement suggests that in order for a Muslim country to qualify as a valid Islamic state, *Shari'ah* must be the governing authority and Allah's limits must be observed. However, a look into *Shari'ah* law and how it defines the *dar al-harb* offers a much broader claim for Muslim lands.

The *'Umdat al-Salik* offers an explanation of what is meant by the *dar al-harb*, or what it calls *enemy lands*. In providing an interpretation of a formal legal opinion (*fatwa*) issued by the *mufti* of *Dar al-'Ulum* in Deoband, India, it states that “areas where Muslims reside and there is a remnant of Islam's rules—even if this is limited to marriages and what pertains to them, for example—are considered *Muslim lands*.”¹¹¹ It goes on to define the only three conditions under which a Muslim land becomes an enemy land:

(a) that the security of Muslims through their leader no longer exists and the security of non-Muslims has taken its place; (b) that they have been surrounded on all sides such that it is impossible for the aid of Muslims to reach them; (c) and that not a single one of Islam's rules remains therein (*which effectively means that none of the lands that Islam has spread to and in which some thing of it remains can be considered an enemy land*). As for other countries, enemy lands (*dar al-harb*, lit[erally], “abode of war”) consist of those with whom the Muslim countries (*dar al-Islam*) are at a state of war)...¹¹²

So, according to classic Sunni Islamic law, any land previously under Islamic rule where remnant populations of Muslims are allowed to safely and openly practice at least some form of their religion, is still considered a Muslim land. This would suggest a territorial

¹¹¹ibn Naqib, 946-947. Book W “Notes and Appendices,” w43.5, “What is Meant by ‘Enemy Lands’ (*Dar al-Harb*).”

¹¹²Ibid. Italics added by author for emphasis.

claim on behalf of the *dar al-Islam* of any previously held region that does not explicitly prohibit the practice of Islam.

Opening the World to Islam

Another very important aspect of the relationship of the *dar al-Islam* to the *dar al-harb* is that from the perspective of those waging *jihād*, they are waging a continuous defensive fight initiated by those who reject the faith of Islam. In their eyes, the act of not being Muslim is a declaration of war against the *dar al-Islam*. From this perspective, all wars fought by Muslims are defensive, and therefore, provide *jus ad bellum* (justification for going to war) and legitimacy for any conflict in which they choose to engage. Qur'anic verses such as those below, both from the Medinan period, inspire Muslims to wage a ceaseless holy war against unbelievers:

*Those who believe fight in the cause of God, and those who reject Faith fight in the cause of Evil: so fight ye against the friends of Satan: feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan.*¹¹³

*Qur'an 4:76
Medinan Period Revelation*

*O Prophet! Strive hard against the Unbelievers and the Hypocrites, and be firm against them. Their abode is Hell—an evil refuge indeed.*¹¹⁴

*Qur'an 9:73
Medinan Period Revelation*

Through such verses, Muslims are inspired to wage *jihād* against the *dar al-harb* for the sake of establishing the ultimate peace of Islam.

¹¹³Yusuf Ali, 202. *Sūra Nisāa* 4.76.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 202. *Sūra Tauba* 9.73. The qur'anic reference to *Hypocrites* refers to those Muslims who accept the bounds and bounty of Islam but are not willing to take up the obligations of Islam such as *jihād*. Hence, this is part of the qur'anic basis for fighting non-conforming Muslims and treating them as unbelievers. The *Umdat al-Salik* defines hypocrisy as “when a person’s outward does not correspond to his inward, or his words to his deeds” (ibn Naqib, 753. Book R “Holding One’s Tongue” r16.1, “Hypocrisy”).

Bassam Tibi, a German political scientist of Syrian origin, known for his analysis of international relations concerning Islamic countries and civilization, makes the following point on the Muslim perspective regarding this establishment of peace:

It is important to note that the expression “*dar al-harb*” (house of war) is not qur’anic; it was coined in the age of Islamic military expansion. It is, however, in line with the qur’anic revelation dividing the world into a peaceful part (the Islamic community) and a hostile part (unbelievers who are expected to convert to Islam, if not freely then through the instrument of war). In this sense, Muslims believe that expansion through war is not aggression but a fulfillment of the qur’anic command to spread Islam as a way to peace. The resort to force to disseminate Islam is not war (*harb*), a word that is used only to describe the use of force by non-Muslims. Islamic wars are not *hurub* (the plural of *harb*) but rather *futuhāt*, acts of “opening” the world to Islam and expressing Islamic *jihād*.¹¹⁵

Therefore, from the Muslim perspective, only non-Muslims wage war. Muslims only have the capability to open the world to Islam in order to provide for the peace it promises. This is how Jihadis are able to legitimize their actions and transfer blame to non-Muslims for obstructing the security of the Muslim world. Tibi goes on to explain this transference of responsibility within the context of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*:

Relations between *dar al-Islam*, the home of peace, and *dar al-harb*, the world of unbelievers, nevertheless take place in a state of war, according to the *Qur’an* and to the authoritative commentaries of Islamic jurists. Unbelievers who stand in the way, creating obstacles for the *da’wa* [the call to disseminate Islam throughout the world], are blamed for this state of war, for the *da’wa* can be pursued peacefully if others submit to it. In other words, those who resist Islam cause wars and are responsible for them.¹¹⁶

The imperative for *da’wa*, in part, drives those claiming to be the Jihadi vanguard on behalf of the *dar al-Islam*. They heed the guidance of Sayyid Qutb who laid down that Muslims are accountable to God alone and that human government was illegitimate. It

¹¹⁵Bassam Tibi, “War and Peace in Islam,” in *The Legacy of “Jihād”: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims*, ed. Andrew G. Bostom (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2005), 328.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

was therefore a proper target for *jihād*, which should be waged by true believers, “destroying the kingdom of man to establish the kingdom of heaven on earth.”¹¹⁷

Perpetual Clash of Civilizations

The incompatibility of the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb* portends significant challenges for the non-Muslim world. This conflict, whether acknowledged or not, has been ever-present and has shaped the outlook of Muslims since the days of Muhammad. The Prophet’s conquests at Medina forged the centuries-old thinking about qur’anic concepts of war and the relationship between the two disparate worlds. The focus of bringing these two worlds to resolve was the concept of *jihād*. Khadurri explains:

The instrument which would transform the *dar al-harb* into the *dar al-Islam* was the *jihād*. The *jihād* was not merely a duty to be fulfilled by each individual; it was also above all a political obligation imposed collectively upon the subjects of the state so as to achieve Islam’s ultimate aim—the universalization of the faith and the establishment of God’s sovereignty over the world.¹¹⁸

The longstanding tradition of *jihād* to expand the influence of Islam was a sanctioned requirement levied upon Muslims by the Islamic state to fulfill qur’anic obligations. The sword became the primary means for the *dar al-Islam* to eclipse the *dar al-harb*, thus establishing the unchanged Muslim perspective of the non-Muslim world. Bassam Tibi offers a more potent explanation:

The establishment of the new Islamic polity at Medina [following Muhammad’s conquest] and the spread of the new religion were accomplished by waging war. The sword became the symbolic image of Islam in the West. In this formative period as well as during the period of classical Islam, Islamic militancy was reinforced by the superiority of Muslims over their enemies. Islamic jurists never dealt with relations with non-Muslims under conditions other than those of “the house of war,” except for the temporary cessation of hostilities under a limited truce.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷Phillips, 142.

¹¹⁸Khadduri, 15.

¹¹⁹Tibi, 327.

Conquest, under the mandate of *da'wa* to establish the *dar al-Islam*, became the principal medium for all relations with non-Muslims. From this perspective, the requirement for the *dar al-Islam* to wage war against the *dar al-harb* has framed the Muslim perspective of non-Muslims from the beginning.

Despite this incompatibility with the current international system, there has yet to be an authoritative modification to this Islamic worldview.¹²⁰ According to Tibi, the attitude of Muslims toward war and nonviolence can be summed up briefly:

...there is no Islamic tradition of nonviolence and no presumption against war. But war is never glorified and is viewed simply as the last resort in responding to the *da'wa* to disseminate Islam, made necessary by the refusal of unbelievers to submit to Islamic rule. In other words, there is no such thing as Islamic pacifism.¹²¹

As the West debates its compatibility with Islam, and whether or not its war on terrorism is a religious war, the verdict has already been established in the minds of its foes. In the words of intelligence analyst and author Stephen Coughlin, “they’ve been fighting a clash of civilizations since the days of Muhammad.”¹²²

Section Summary

The bipolar worldview of Muslims has shaped their culture and thinking since the establishment of Islam. The competing spheres of the *dar al-Islam*, the abode of peace and Islam, and the *dar al-harb*, the abode of war and hostility, essentially equate to that which is Muslim and that which is not. This perspective continues today, especially for the Jihadis, who view themselves as the vanguard for the exclusive establishment of the *dar al-Islam*. Though there are differing opinions, Islamic law suggests that any territory previously under Islamic rule, where remnant populations of Muslims are allowed to

¹²⁰Ibid., 328.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Coughlin, interview.

openly and safely practice even a portion of their faith, can still be considered Muslim lands. If this is truly part of the Muslim point of view, it implies that the *dar al-Islam* already has a significant foothold upon the *dar al-harb*.

Furthermore, the obligation of the *dar al-Islam* to assert itself in defense of the *dar al-harb* creates an ongoing clash of apocalyptic proportion. What makes this even more challenging for non-Muslims, is the legitimacy afforded Jihadis under their claim of defensive warfare. Through Muslim eyes, rejection of the Islamic way of life is an offensive declaration of war by the *dar al-harb* and justifies any *defensive* action to preserve the right of the *dar al-Islam* to assert itself. This longstanding Jihadi underpinning is once again well on its way to manifesting itself as the next great bipolar struggle.

Submission

Section Introduction

Though Islam seeks to assert itself for the establishment of the *dar al-Islam*, its underlying purpose is that of submission. In spiritual terms, submitting to the will of Allah and following the ways of the Prophet is promised to bring ultimate inner peace. However, for those who would resist Islam, the driving force of submission has a completely different significance. Medinan revelations and *hadīth* instruct Muslims to fight those who refuse to submit to the peaceful ways of Islam. Once subdued, non-Muslims are expected to pay a poll tax, or *jizya*, as a symbol of their submission. In addition, if these people belong to one of the tolerated religions they may be given a protected status known as *ahl al-dhimma* and are designated *dhimmis*. Though protected,

Muslims levy heavy restrictions upon the *dhimmi* peoples, making them second-class citizens in every sense. Violation of these rules can result in severe punishment.

The subjectivity of granting *dhimmi* status to non-Muslims living under Muslim rule is very much dependent upon their utility to the Muslim state. However, it is also likely for non-Muslims to lose their protected status and be designated as *kufir*, or unbelievers, a crime which is punishable by death. Paralleling the bipolar perspective of *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb*, Muslims see those around them as either part of the *Ummah* or as unbelieving *kufir*. This belief makes non-Muslims inferior to Muslims and warrants submission as second-class citizens or, in the worst extreme, those deserving of the penalty for apostasy.

Submission

The significance of submission is inherent in the very name of the religion itself. In Arabic, *islam* is a verbal noun derived from the root word *aslama*, which means “he gave up, surrendered, submitted.” In purely etymological terms, *islam* thus signifies the surrender or submission of oneself to something greater or more powerful.¹²³ Submission, then, becomes the driving force behind *everything* the religion espouses and does. For those who wage *jihād*, they do not do it in the name of a religion—Islam—but in the name of what it signifies. Muslims wage *jihād* for the sake of submission to the *dar al-Islam*. The *Qur'an* commands Muslims to fight those who do not believe in Allah, his Messenger, or qur'anic precepts, and to force their submission. *Qur'an* 9:29, a verse for which there is much legal support, places emphasis on ensuring that non-Muslims willingly submit and feel subdued:

¹²³Esposito, 66-67.

*Fight those who believe not in God Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the Religion of truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.*¹²⁴

*Qur'an 9:29
Medinan Period Revelation*

Similarly, Sunni Islamic scholar, Imam Bukhari (810-870 A.D.), most known for authoring the highly regarded *Sahih Bukhari* collection of *hadīth*, captured the following words of the Prophet Muhammad:

I have been commanded to fight people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, and perform the prayer, and pay *zakat*. If they say it, they have saved their blood and possessions from me, *except for the rights of Islam over them*. And their final reckoning is with Allah.¹²⁵

Again, “the rights of Islam over them” signifies submission to the rules imposed by the religion regarding the treatment of non-Muslims. The nature of Islam is to unceasingly force submission, whether spiritually or physically. If it does not possess the dominance to do so overtly, it will attempt to do so covertly, in a symbolic manner. Regardless, it is the ever-present instinct that compels every action done under the auspices of Islam.

One of the most significant means of imposing submission in a symbolic manner is the *jizya*. The *jizya* is a tax levied upon non-Muslims living under Muslim rule that was used primarily as an instrument of subjugation. In his commentary on *Qur'an* 9:29, translator Yusuf Ali offers the following regarding the *jizya*:

Jizya: the root meaning is compensation. The derived meaning, which became the technical meaning, was a poll-tax levied from those who did not accept Islam, but were willing to live under the protection of Islam, and were thus tacitly willing to submit to its ideals being enforced in the Muslim State, saving only their personal liberty of conscience as regarded themselves. There was no

¹²⁴Yusuf Ali, 447. *Sūra Tauba* 9.29. Italics added by author for emphasis. *Zakat* is the Islamic concept of tithing or almsgiving.

¹²⁵ibn Naqib, 599. Book O “Justice,” o9.0, “*Jihād*.” Italics added by author for emphasis.

amount fixed for it, and in any case it was merely symbolical—an acknowledgement that those whose religion was tolerated would in their turn not interfere with the preaching and progress of Islam. Imam Sháfi'í suggests one *dinár* per year which would be the Arabian gold *dinár* of the Muslim States....The tax varied in amount, and there were exemptions for the poor, for females and children (according to Abú Hanífa), for slaves, and for monks and hermits. Being a tax on able bodied males of military age, it was in a sense a commutation for military service.¹²⁶

More importantly, Yusuf Ali continues regarding the meaning of the *jizya* itself and the manner in which it was paid. From *Qur'an* 9:29, the words “with willing submission” are translated from the Arabic words, *'An Yadin*, and emphasize the subjugation of those paying the *jizya*. Yusuf Ali comments:

'An Yadin (literally, from the hand) has been variously interpreted. The hand being the symbol of power and authority. I accept the interpretation “in token of willing submission.” The *jizya* was thus partly symbolic and partly a commutation for military service, but as the amount was insignificant and the exemptions numerous, its symbolic character predominated.¹²⁷

Under the subtitle “The Objectives of *Jihād*,” the *'Umdat al-Salik* offers the following legal ruling regarding the guidance found in *Qur'an* 9:29:

The caliph makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians (provided he has first invited them to enter Islam in faith and practice, and if they will not, then invited them to enter the social order of Islam by paying the non-Muslim poll tax (*jizya*)—*which is the significance of their paying it, not the money itself*—while remaining in their ancestral religions; and the war continues until they become Muslim or else pay the non-Muslim poll tax in accordance with the word of Allah Most High.¹²⁸

Though the *jizya* serves as a primary means of incorporating non-Muslims into the Islamic social order, it must be noted that it is merely an *option* afforded Muslim societies for dealing with unbelievers. For the sake of preserving the security and dominance of

¹²⁶Yusuf Ali, 447. *Súra Tauba* 9.29. See Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 1281).

¹²⁷Ibid. *Súra Tauba* 9.29. See Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 1282).

¹²⁸ibn Naqib, 602. Book O “Justice,” o9.8, “*Jihād*.” Italics added by author for emphasis.

the *Ummah*, the *jizya* will only be imposed after non-Muslims have willingly submitted to Muslim rule and complete subjugation has been imposed.¹²⁹

The *Qur'an* is explicit regarding when non-Muslims are allowed to be assimilated into the society. *Qur'an* 8:67 states:

*It is not fitting for an Apostle that he should have prisoners of war until he hath thoroughly subdued the land.*¹³⁰

*Qur'an 8:67
Medinan Period Revelation*

Of utmost concern to the Muslim community is its self-preservation and ability to continue expanding its influence. If non-Muslims are interpreted as a threat to the community, having not yet been “thoroughly subdued,” they will be dealt with using more severe means. If absorbing non-Muslims becomes too much of a security risk, any protected status they may have hoped to enjoy is no longer binding. Islamic law emphasizes this prime directive for preserving the *Ummah*:

It is unlawful to kill a non-Muslim to whom a Muslim has given his guarantee of protection (whether the non-Muslim is one or more than one, *provided the number is limited*, and the Muslim’s *protecting them does not harm the Muslims*, as when they are spies)...¹³¹

The only insurance against such conditional provisions for non-Muslims is to completely submit by converting to Islam. Again, *Shari'ah* speaks clearly on the options available to the Muslim leader regarding non-Muslims under his jurisdiction who refuse to convert:

Whoever enters Islam before being captured may not be killed or his property confiscated, or his young children taken captive. When a child or woman is taken captive, they become slaves by the fact of capture, and the woman’s previous marriage is immediately annulled. When an adult male is taken captive, the caliph considers the interest (of Islam and the Muslims) and decides between the prisoner’s death, slavery, release without paying anything, or ransoming himself

¹²⁹Nyazee, *Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad*, 252.

¹³⁰Yusuf Ali, 432. *Sūra Anfāl* 8.67.

¹³¹ibn Naqib, 602. Book O “Justice,” o9.11, “*Jihād*.” Italics added by author for emphasis.

in exchange for money or for a Muslim captive held by the enemy. If the prisoner becomes a Muslim (before the caliph chooses any of the four alternatives) then he may not be killed, and one of the other three alternatives is chosen.¹³²

Since the interest of Islam and the Muslims is of prime importance, the fate of non-Muslims is largely contextually dependent. For those non-Muslims who do submit and are allowed to live under Muslim rule, measures exist to ensure that their submission is preserved. Those granted the status of *ahl al-dhimma*, or protected peoples, suffer a life of continuous scrutiny and subjugation as second-class citizens.

Ahl al-Dhimma

The status of *ahl al-dhimma* can be granted to those groups who are considered to be People of the Book (*al al-kitab*), or those whose religions are based upon prior revelations from Allah. A formal agreement of protection is made with citizens who are Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Samaritans and Sabians (if their religions do not respectively contradict the fundamental bases of Judaism and Christianity), and those who adhere to the religion of Abraham or one of the other prophets.¹³³ They are treated as minorities under the protection of Islam as believers in Allah, despite their refusal to accept the prophethood of Muhammad.¹³⁴ The rules and regulations concerning *dhimmi* peoples developed during the era of Muslim dominion in Europe and Asia:

During the long centuries of Arab-Muslim domination, the surviving remnants of once-flourishing Jewish and Christian communities—who had neither fled nor been killed nor converted to Islam—were juridically and socially relegated to an inferior condition of subjection and humiliation difficult to comprehend today.

Their status was that of *ahl al-dhimma*—protected peoples, i.e., peoples tolerated in the Muslim lands: *dar al-Islam* (House of Islam)—which subjected them to the disabilities and humiliations laid down in specific regulations

¹³²Ibid. Book O “Justice,” o9.12-14, “*Jihād*.”

¹³³Ibid., 607. Book O “Justice,” o11.1, “Non-Muslim Subjects of the Islamic State (*Ahl al-Dhimma*).”

¹³⁴Esposito, 307.

commonly known as the Covenant of Umar, which degraded both the individual and the community.¹³⁵

British writer Bat Ye'or has written extensively on the concept and history of what she has coined *dhimmitude*. In her mind, *dhimmitude* is merely another instrument of *jihād* that seeks to establish the dominance of the *dar al-Islam* over the *dar al-harb*.

She writes:

The basic aspects of the *dhimmi* mentality are related to characteristics of its status and environment, because *dhimmitude* operates exclusively within the sphere of *jihād*. Contrary to common belief, *jihād* is not limited to holy war conducted militarily; it encompasses all strategies, including peaceful means, aimed at the unification of all religions within Islamic dogma.¹³⁶

Despite the “peaceful means” offered to the People of the Book, it is important to note that this agreement between the dominant Muslim power and the subjugated peoples was rather exclusive. Other groups were usually given the choice between conversion to Islam or death.¹³⁷ *Shari'ah* law codifies this practice of requiring total submission for those not of the Book:

The caliph fights *all other peoples* until they become Muslim (because they are not a people with a Book, nor honored as such, and are not permitted to settle with paying the poll tax (*jizya*)).¹³⁸

Even those fortunate enough to be granted *dhimmi* status are placed in such a state of submission it is hard to comprehend the degree of subjugation they must face as second-class citizens.

¹³⁵David G. Littman and Bat Ye'or, “Protected Peoples Under Islam,” in *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance: How Islamic Law Treats Non-Muslims*, ed. Robert Spencer (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2005), 92.

¹³⁶Bat Ye'or, “Eastern Christians Torn Asunder,” *National Review Online*, 18 September 2007; available from <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-batyeor091803.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2007.

¹³⁷Littman and Ye'or, 104. Reference endnote number one.

¹³⁸ibn Naqib, 603. Book O “Justice,” o9.8, “*Jihād*.” Though according to the Hanafi school, peoples of all other religions, even idol worshippers, are permitted to live under the protection of the Islamic state if they either become Muslim or agree to pay the poll tax, the sole exceptions to which are apostates from Islam and idol worshippers who are Arabs, neither of whom has any choice but becoming a Muslim.

This second-class status goes beyond any cultural or ethnic boundaries imposed by a Muslim populace. The *dhimmi* peoples are tolerated only for their utility to the Muslim state, and nothing more. Antoine Fattal, a Lebanese Professor of Law, whose *Le Statut Légal de Non-Musulmans en Pays d'Islam* remains the benchmark analysis of non-Muslims (especially Christians and Jews) living under the *Shari'ah*, shares the following:

The *dhimmi* is a second-class citizen. If he is tolerated it is for reason of a spiritual nature, since there is always the hope that he might be converted; or of a material nature, since he bears almost the whole tax burden. He has his place in society, but he is constantly reminded of his inferiority....In no way is the *dhimmi* equal to the Muslim. He is marked out for social inequality and belongs to a despised caste; unequal in regard to individual rights...¹³⁹

This social inequality levied upon *dhimmis* would be much more bearable if it were not for the legal requirements imposed by *Shari'ah*. The covenant that is to be established between the Muslim power and its subjugated peoples brings with it a series of conditions that serve to force submission. From the *dhimmi* perspective, this covenant is a delicate promise, as adherence to its domineering rules are under constant scrutiny. *Shari'ah* law states:

Such an agreement is only valid when the subject peoples: (a) follow the rules of Islam (those mentioned below and those involving public behavior and dress, though in acts of worship and their private lives, the subject communities have their own laws, judges, and courts, enforcing the rules of their own religion among themselves); (b) and pay the non-Muslim poll tax (*jizya*).¹⁴⁰

It goes on to list these rules of Islam which appear to severely constrain the religious freedom promised in the previous ruling:

...non-Muslim subjects are obliged to comply with Islamic rules that pertain to the safety and indemnity of life, reputation, and property. In addition, they: (1) are penalized for committing adultery or theft, though not for drunkenness; (2) are

¹³⁹ Antoine Fattal, *Le Statut Légal des Non-Musulmans en Pays d'Islam* (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1958), 369-72; quoted in Littman and Ye'or, 94.

¹⁴⁰ Ibn Naqib, 607. Book O "Justice," o11.3-4, "Non-Muslim Subjects of the Islamic State (*Ahl al-Dhimma*)."

distinguished from Muslims in dress, wearing a wide cloth belt (*zunnar*); (3) are not greeted with “*as-Salumu ‘alaykum*” [Peace be upon you]; (4) must keep to the side of the street; (5) may not build higher than or as high as the Muslim’s buildings, though if they acquire a tall house, it is not razed; (6) are forbidden to openly display wine or pork, to ring church bells or display crosses, recite the *Torah* or *Evangel* [*Gospel*] aloud, or make public display of their funerals and feastdays; (7) are forbidden to build new churches.¹⁴¹

Interestingly, one of these rules requires that *dhimmis* distinguish themselves in dress from Muslims with a wide cloth belt. In Baghdad, the seat of Islamic enlightenment, the *dhimmi* peoples dressed in clothes bearing yellow symbols—a marker resuscitated centuries later by the Nazis.¹⁴²

Such strict rules do not provide subjugated peoples much space for personal liberty. Should *dhimmis* exercise more freedom than they are afforded, their fate lies with the subjective decision of the Muslim leader. The *Qur'an* authorizes martial action and implies a release from the covenant if it is violated on behalf of the *dhimmi* peoples:

*But if they violate their oaths after their covenant, and taunt you for your Faith—fight ye the chiefs of Unfaith: for their oaths are nothing to them: that thus they may be restrained.*¹⁴³

*Qur'an 9:12
Medinan Period Revelation*

Shari'ah law provides a specific list of actions that may break the covenant, however, the list may be expanded by the Muslim state depending upon the amount of control it chooses to impose. The *‘Umdat al-Salik* states:

If non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state refuse to conform to the rules of Islam, or to pay the non-Muslim poll tax, then their agreement with the state has been violated. The agreement is also violated if the state has stipulated any of the following things break it: (1) commits adultery with a Muslim woman or marries her; (2) conceals spies of hostile forces; (3) leads a Muslim away from Islam; (4)

¹⁴¹Ibid., 608. Book O “Justice,” o11.5, “Non-Muslim Subjects of the Islamic State (*Ahl al-Dhimma*).”

¹⁴²Manji, 79.

¹⁴³Yusuf Ali, 441. *Sūra Tauba* 9.12.

kills a Muslim; (5) or mentions something impermissible about Allah, the Prophet, or Islam.¹⁴⁴

When a subject's agreement with the state has been violated, the caliph chooses between four alternatives: the prisoner's death, slavery, release without paying anything, or ransom in exchange for money or for a Muslim captive held by the enemy.¹⁴⁵ Regardless of the alternative chosen, Islamic law places subjugated non-Muslim peoples in a state of submission under Islam, thereby physically, if not spiritually, attaining the religion's overall objective.

Kufr

Though Islamic law does contain some provision for mercy under the *ahl al-dhimma* precepts, it can also be argued that because of the jurisprudence regarding those who reject Islam, this provision could easily be overruled. Those designated as unbelievers are labeled as *kufir* which in Arabic means “unbeliever, infidel, or impious wretch.” It possesses a literal sense of “one who does not admit the blessings of God” and is derived from the root word *kafara*, which means to “cover up, conceal, or deny”—in other words, one who covers up, conceals or denies the “Religion of Truth.”¹⁴⁶ For Muslims, the term *kufir* denotes an inferior status, much like that of *dhimmi*. Dr. Taj Hargey, chairman of the Muslim Education Centre in the city of Oxford, England has said there is a virtual apartheid, self-imposed by those Muslims who regard non-Muslims as *kufir*, or inferior, although they would never say so in public. He mentions:

¹⁴⁴Ibn Naqib, 609. Book O “Justice,” o11.9, “Non-Muslim Subjects of the Islamic State (*Ahl al-Dhimma*).”

¹⁴⁵Ibid., 604, 609. Book O “Justice,” o9.14, “The Rules of Warfare” and o11.11, “The Non-Muslim Poll Tax.” These alternatives are the same as those listed for prisoners of war after a territory has come under the control of a Muslim force.

¹⁴⁶Online Etymology Dictionary, word search: *kaffir*; available from <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=kaffir&searchmode=none>; Internet; accessed 19 February 2007; Yusuf Ali, 449. *Sūra Tauba* 9.33.

We see it from the time you're a child, you're given this idea that those people, they are *kufir*, they're unbelievers. They are not equal to you, they are different to you. You are superior to them because you have the truth, they don't have the truth. You will go to heaven, they will go to hell. So we have this from a very young age.¹⁴⁷

The label of *kufir*, while denigrating, carries with it significant legal aspects that could be used to bypass the protected status for People of the Book.

Under Islamic law, *kufir* is the most heinous of unlawful acts. Under the *Shari'ah*'s classifications of human acts, it describes the unlawful (*haram*) as what the Lawgiver [Allah] strictly forbids. Someone who commits an unlawful act deserves punishment, while one who refrains from it out of obedience to the command of Allah is rewarded. Scholars distinguish between three levels of the unlawful, the highest of which is unbelief (*kufir*), which are sins which put one beyond the pale of Islam and necessitate stating the Testification of Faith (*Shahada*) to reenter it.¹⁴⁸

Though People of the Book supposedly enjoy a protected status under Islamic rule it is important to return to the definition for *true faith in Islam*. True faith in Islam is defined in *Shari'ah* as follows:

To believe in His inspired Books means those which He revealed to His messengers, *believe* meaning to be convinced that they are the word of Allah Most High, and all they contain is the truth. (*The obligation of belief applies to the original revelations, not the various scriptures in the hands of non-Muslims, which are textually corrupt in their present form.*)¹⁴⁹

Because *Shari'ah* law distinguishes between the “original revelations” and the “textually corrupt” scriptures in the hands of non-Muslims, the guaranteed protection for People of the Book is essentially dissolved. Worshipping *tainted* versions of Allah's divine

¹⁴⁷Taj Hargey, BBC TV, *Panorama*, 21 August 2005; quoted in Phillips, 86.

¹⁴⁸ibn Naqib, 30-31. Book C “The Nature of Legal Rulings,” c2.5, “Types of Human Act.”

¹⁴⁹Ibid., 811. Book U “The Gabriel Hadith,” u3.4, “Belief in Allah's Inspired Books.” Italics added by author for emphasis.

guidance makes People of the Book unbelievers, and therefore, *kufir*. In describing the finality of the Prophet's message, the *'Umdat al-Salik* clarifies further:

...it is unbelief (*kufir*) to hold that the remnant cults now bearing the names of formerly valid religions, such as "Christianity" or "Judaism," are acceptable to Allah Most High after He has sent the final Messenger (Allah bless him give him peace) to the entire world. This is a matter over which there is no disagreement among Islamic scholars...¹⁵⁰

It also targets the other Abrahamic faiths when it describes acts that entail apostasy from Islam (i.e., leaving Islam). Some of them include:

...to intend to commit unbelief [*kufir*], even if in the future. And like this intention is hesitating whether to do so or not: one thereby immediately commits unbelief; to speak words that imply unbelief such as "Allah is the third of three," or "I am Allah"...; to deny the existence of Allah, His beginningless eternity, or to deny any of His attributes which the consensus of Muslims ascribes to him...; to deny any verse of the *Qur'an* or anything which by scholarly consensus [*ijma'*] belongs to it, or to add a verse that does not belong to it...; to revile the religion of Islam...; or to deny that Allah intended to the Prophet's message to be the religion followed by the entire world... There are others, for the subject is nearly limitless.¹⁵¹

This suggests that to deny Islam in any fashion is to be a *kufir*, which in turn, is to commit the awful crime of apostasy. Apostasy elicits a very final ruling from the Muslim community. For those raised among Muslims who deny the obligatoriness of following Islam, they are labeled as *kufir* and are subsequently executed for their unbelief.¹⁵² With *kufir* comes the ruling of apostasy, regardless of where one was raised. *Shari'ah* presents a clear verdict on this crime when it states, "There is no indemnity for killing an apostate (or any expiation, since it is killing someone who deserves to die)."¹⁵³ Perhaps it is this

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 846. Book W "Notes and Appendices," w4.1, "The Finality of the Prophet's Message."

¹⁵¹Ibid., 596-598. Book O "Justice," o8.7, "Apostasy from Islam (*Ridda*)."

¹⁵²Ibid., 109. Book F "The Prayer (*Salat*)," f1.3, "Who Must Pray." Italics added by author for emphasis.

¹⁵³Ibid., 596. Book O "Justice," o8.4, "Apostasy from Islam (*Ridda*)."

In the *hadith* Bukhari 4:283 Muhammad is recorded as saying, "I asked Ali, 'Do you have the knowledge of any Divine Inspiration besides what is in Allah's Book?' 'Ali replied, 'No, by Him Who splits the grain of corn and creates the soul. I don't think we have such knowledge, but we have the ability of understanding which Allah may

type of jurisprudence by which Jihadis seek to force submission upon the world in the cause of Allah.

Section Summary

Because of its inherency in the religion itself, submission is one of the most powerful of Jihadi underpinnings. For those who would resist the assertion of Islam, submission manifests itself in very tangible ways. Submission to Islam underscores these methods of dealing with non-Muslim subjects for the sole purpose of making them *feel subdued*. It also shapes the nature of every formal interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims. If the Muslim state does not have the means to force submission, it will find more subtle ways to communicate Islam's superiority.

If it does possess that authority, establishing covenants with non-Muslims and granting status as *ahl al-dhimma* is entirely dependent upon, first, the utility of the non-Muslim subjects to the state, and second, their qualification as Peoples of the Book. Under this protected status, they will be forced to pay the *jizya*, which, as discussed, has more to do with the significance of paying than it does the revenue it produces. Despite the many other narrow constraints levied upon the *dhimmi* peoples, their unbelief in Islam and their faith in *textually corrupt* versions of Allah's revelations potentially condemn them to apostasy as *kufirs*. It is this mounting perspective of non-Muslims that emboldens Jihadi conduct and provides them legitimacy in the eyes of growing numbers of Muslims. As one of the most foundational of Jihadi underpinnings, the principle of submission makes Islam a ready-made religion for waging *jihād* against all that is non-Muslim.

endow a person with, so that he may understand the *Qur'an*, and we have what is written in this paper as well.' I asked, 'What is written in this paper?' He replied, '(The regulations of) blood-money, the freeing of captives, and the judgment that no Muslim should be killed for killing an infidel.'"

Jihād

Section Introduction

No discussion on the foundations of Jihadi conduct would be complete without a treatment of the concept of *jihād* itself. This topic is being handled last because it is the capstone principle for all Jihadi activity. Though legitimized by the other precepts presented in this paper, *jihād* is the instrument of war that *operationalizes* the ideological goals of the Jihadis and further emboldens the underpinnings that sanction its employment. To understand *jihād*, it is important to first accurately define what is meant by the term. Unfortunately, most Western definitions subdivide *jihād* into the greater and lesser *jihād* and treat them as if they were two distinct concepts, when in fact, one is merely the manifestation of the other. The obligation for Muslims to wage *jihād* runs through both the spiritual and legal spheres of Muslim existence, making *jihād* itself an underpinning of Jihadist conduct. Both qur'anic and legal precepts compel Muslims to wage *jihād*, if they possess the capability to do so, for the sake of establishing the *dar al-Islam*. The Jihadis who challenge the West view themselves as the revolutionary vanguard that will birth the *dar al-Islam*. Both Islamic law and the *Qur'an* enable this line of thinking, thereby creating more legitimacy for their actions. In their eyes, they cannot lose because of the promise of either victory over the *dar al-harb* or martyrdom that earns them entry into Paradise.

Jihād Defined

The Arabic word *jihād*, the verbal noun of the verb *jāhada*, literally means to strive, to exert oneself, or to struggle.¹⁵⁴ However, like many words, the cultural

¹⁵⁴Rudolph Peters, *Jihād in Classical and Modern Islam*, 2d ed. (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005), 1.

meaning of *jihād* runs much deeper than its etymological roots. *Jihād* is described in two capacities, one being the greater *jihād* and the other the lesser *jihād*. The following description offers some distinction:

The greater *jihād* (*al-jihād al-akbar*) refers to the personal struggle of the heart, where the believer strives to overcome personal temptations and the carnal self. This inner struggle is the highest form of *jihād*. Here Muslims strive to internalize the Islamic message through such prescribed actions as prayer, fasting and almsgiving. The lesser *jihād* (*al-jihād al-asghar*) is the outward struggle of the Muslim against the enemies of the faith.¹⁵⁵

Sometimes this lesser *jihād* is characterized more tangibly as *jihād* fought on the battlefield.¹⁵⁶ Regardless, Western interpretations of these two distinctions often view them as separate manifestations of a Muslim's struggle—the inner struggle to become a better Muslim and the outer struggle in defense of Islam. From a holistic perspective, however, *jihād* is much more singular in nature. Both are very real concepts for Muslims, though the greater *jihād* should be viewed as a spiritual manifestation of the more physical lesser *jihād*. The internal strife of the greater *jihād* can also be interpreted as a means of disciplining oneself for the physical and mental challenges of the lesser *jihād*. In this sense, it is the lesser *jihād* that prevails in terms of the overall meaning of the word.

Sacred texts speak extensively about the concept of the lesser *jihād*, especially the Medinan revelations of the *Qur'an* and many of the most reputable *hadīth*. In fact, there is an entire genre of *hadīth* known as *fada'il al-jihād* (the merits of the holy war), based on the nine-volume *hadīth* collection of Muhammad ibn Isma'īl al-Bukhari (810-70 A.D.). Al-Bukhari's collection is considered to be the most respected and authoritative of

¹⁵⁵George W. Gawrych, "Jihād, War, and Terrorism," *Small Wars Journal* [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/gawrych.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2007.

¹⁵⁶M.J. Akbar, *The Shade of Swords: Jihād and the Conflict Between Islam and Christianity* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 2.

all *hadīth* collections. Interestingly, he dedicates almost one-third of his fourth volume on *jihād* as physical holy war against infidels.¹⁵⁷ In addition, historian Bernard Lewis has shown that "the overwhelming majority of classical theologians, jurists, and traditionalists... understood the obligation of *jihād* in a military sense."¹⁵⁸ In a 1912 article titled "*Jihād*," writer and Islamic scholar, W.R. Gardner suggests that to understand the true meaning of *jihād* one must look beyond the etymological derivations of the word:

For the question of what *jihād* is cannot be settled by reference alone to the etymology of the word *jihād*.... And whatever may be the etymological meaning of the word *jihād*, there can be no gainsaying the fact that it is sometimes used in the *Qur'an* in the sense of warlike actions, a warfare for the sake of the Faith. And when one asks what the teaching of Mohammedanism is concerning *jihād*, the word is employed in this latter sense.¹⁵⁹

The most enlightening exposition, however, comes from the legal meaning of *jihād*, as defined in the *Umdat al-Salik*:

Jihād means to war against non-Muslims, and is etymologically derived from the word *mujāhada*, signifying warfare to establish the religion. *And it is the lesser jihād*. As for the greater *jihād*, it is spiritual warfare against the lower self...¹⁶⁰

Any juristic use of the term *jihād*, then, refers to the *lesser jihād*, or "war against non-Muslims...to establish the religion." The fact that Islam treats violent *jihād* as a regulated endeavor, governed by very strict laws of conduct, only lends merit to the above definition.¹⁶¹ According to Stephen Coughlin, it is the only form of warfare

¹⁵⁷David Bukay, "The Religions Foundations of Suicide Bombings," *The Middle East Quarterly*, 13:4, Fall 2006 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.meforum.org/article/1003>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2007.

¹⁵⁸Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 72; quoted in Bukay.

¹⁵⁹W.R.W. Gardner, "*Jihād*," in *The Legacy of "Jihād": Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims*, ed. Andrew G. Bostom (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2005), 295.

¹⁶⁰ibn Naqib, 599. Book O "Justice," o9.0, "*Jihād*." Italics added by author for emphasis.

¹⁶¹Guy Raz, "Exploring the Language of Post-Sept. 11 U.S. Policy," 30 October 2006; available from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6406405>; Internet; accessed 08 January 2007.

authorized in Islamic law and can only be fought in the cause of Allah. When conducted properly, Allah promises victory to his believers, warns of temporary setbacks to test their faith, and promises that he will enfeeble the plans and strategies of the unbelieving enemy. Thus, from a Muslim perspective, it is conceptually impossible for a *jihād* that conforms to the will of Allah to fail.¹⁶²

The Obligation of *Jihād*

Though definitions of *jihād* seem to connote a bent towards its more physical disposition, what empowers its manifestation is the unmistakable obligation to conduct *jihād*. The *Qur'an* is full of commandments to fight against unbelievers, as well as many of the more rigorously authenticated *hadīth*. The following sampling of verses highlights the clarity with which the *Qur'an* speaks regarding the obligatory requirement for *all* believers to conduct *jihād*:

*Fighting is prescribed for you...*¹⁶³

Qur'an 2:216
Medinan Period Revelation

*Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who reject Faith fight in the cause of Evil: so fight ye against the friends of Satan: feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan.*¹⁶⁴

Qur'an 4:76
Medinan Period Revelation

¹⁶²U.S. Central Command, Memorandum for USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, *Imposing Defeat: A Jihadi Tipping Point* (26 September 2005), by Stephen C. Coughlin, Major, Military Intelligence, U.S. Army Reserve. See: *O ye who believe! Fight the unbelievers who gird about you, and let them find firmness in you, and know that Allah is with those who fear Him. (Qur'an 9:123); Allah will certainly aid those who aid His cause, for verily Allah is full of strength, exalted in might, able to enforce His will. (Qur'an 22:40); But He lets you fight in order to test you, some with others... (Qur'an 47:4); Then did He divert you from your foes in order to test you. (Qur'an 3:152); O ye who believe! It is not ye who slew them; it was Allah ... That, and also because Allah is He who makes feeble the plans and stratagems of the unbelievers. (Qur'an 8:17-18); It may be that Allah will restrain the fury of the unbelievers, for Allah is the strongest in might and punishment. (Qur'an 4:84); And Allah turned back the unbelievers for all their fury. (Qur'an 33:25).*

¹⁶³Yusuf Ali, 84. *Sūra Baqarah* 2.216. Italics added by author for emphasis.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 202. *Sūra Nisaa* 4.76.

*...slay them wherever ye find them...*¹⁶⁵

Qur'an 4:89
Medinan Period Revelation

*Muhammad is the Apostle of God: and those who are with him are strong against Unbelievers, (but) compassionate amongst each other.*¹⁶⁶

Qur'an 48:29
Medinan Period Revelation

*Fight those who believe not in God Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the Religion of truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.*¹⁶⁷

Qur'an 9:29
Medinan Period Revelation

*O Prophet! Strive hard against the Unbelievers and the Hypocrites, and be firm against them. Their abode is Hell,—an evil refuge indeed.*¹⁶⁸

Qur'an 9:73 and Qur'an 66:9
Medinan Period Revelation

*O ye who believe! Fight the Unbelievers who gird you about, and let them find firmness in you: and know that Allah is with those who fear Him.*¹⁶⁹

Qur'an 9:123
Medinan Period Revelation

Though there are thousands of *hadīth* that have captured the exploits and sayings of the

Prophet Muhammad, the samples below characterize his perspectives regarding *jihād*:

I have been ordered to fight against all the people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is Allah's messenger, and offer the prayers perfectly, and give the obligatory charity. So if they perform all that, then they

¹⁶⁵Ibid., 207. *Sūra Nisāa* 4.89.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., 1400. *Sūra* 48.29 *Fat-h*. Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 4913): The devotees of God wage unceasing war against evil, for themselves, and for others; but to their own brethren in faith—especially the weaker ones—they are mild and compassionate: they seek out every opportunity to sympathize with them and help them.

¹⁶⁷Ibid., 447. *Sūra Tauba* 9.29. Italics added by author for emphasis.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., 462. *Sūra Tauba* 9.73.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., 478. *Sūra Tauba* 9.123.

save their lives and property from me and their reckoning will be done by Allah.¹⁷⁰

O Allah, you know that there is nothing more beloved to me than to fight in your cause against those who disbelieved your messenger.¹⁷¹

Fourteenth-century Syrian theologian, ibn Taymiyyah is known for his reverence of *jihād* and did much to promulgate its primacy in Islam. Though the citations above are but a small sampling of the obligatory guidance found in sacred Islamic texts, he affirms the volume of mandates available and the importance of engaging in *jihād*:

The command to participate in *jihād* and the mention of its merits occurs innumerable times in the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* [*hadīth*]. Therefore it is the best voluntary (religious) act that man can perform. All scholars agree that it is better than the *hajj* (greater pilgrimage) and the *umra* (lesser pilgrimage), than voluntary *salat* and voluntary fasting, as the *Qur'an* and *Sunna* indicate. The Prophet, Peace be upon him, has said, “The head of the affair is Islam, its central pillar is the *salat* and its summit is the *jihād*.”¹⁷²

Here, even the Prophet speaks of the dominion of *jihād*, making it as obligatory as the five pillars of Islam, if not more so. This sober treatment afforded *jihād* has evoked much legal guidance for the concept, as well.

As previously mentioned, *jihād* is the only form of warfare authorized in Islam and is governed by very strict rules and applications. Islamic law draws from the imperatives established in the *Qur'an* and *hadīth* to codify the obligatory nature of *jihād*. Islamic law speaks distinctively about how *jihād* applies to both the Islamic community and the individual believer. From a communal perspective, the *‘Umdat al-Salik* relates:

¹⁷⁰Muhammad ibn Isma‘il al-Bukhari, *Sahih al-Bukhari*, vol. 1, 25; quoted in Bukay.

¹⁷¹Ibid., 101; quoted in Bukay.

¹⁷²Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, “Al-Siyasa Al-Shariyya,” in *The Legacy of “Jihād”: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims*, ed. Andrew G. Bostom (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2005), 165. The *salat* is the ritual prayer practiced by Muslims in supplication to Allah. The term is commonly used to refer to the five daily prayers, which are compulsory upon all mature Muslims. *Salat* is considered the most important act of worship in Islam and its importance is such that under no circumstances can it be omitted. The imperative to wage *jihād*, then, is even greater than this compulsory act of worship.

Jihād is a communal obligation. When enough people perform it to successfully accomplish it, it is no longer obligatory upon others (the evidence for which is the Prophet's saying, "He who provides the equipment for a soldier in *jihād* has himself performed *jihād*..."¹⁷³)

This passage suggests that though *jihād* is a communal obligation, one may obtain *jihād credit* for merely supporting those who fight on the front lines. Further discussion will, in fact, explore the requirement for a supporting element to remain behind in the conduct of *jihād*. Islamic law goes on to discuss how the failure to wage *jihād* is sin. Further, it distinguishes under what conditions *jihād* becomes personally obligatory, requiring every individual believer to pursue the lesser *jihād*:

If none of those concerned perform *jihād*, and it does not happen at all, then everyone who is aware that it is obligatory is guilty of sin, if there was a possibility of having performed it. In the time of the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) *jihād* was a communal obligation after his emigration (*hijra*) to Medina. As for subsequent times, there are two possible states in respect to non-Muslims.

The first is when they are in their own countries, in which case *jihād* is a communal obligation, and this is what our author is speaking of when he says, "*Jihād* is a communal obligation," meaning upon the Muslims each year.

The second state is when non-Muslims invade a Muslim country or near to one, in which case *jihād* is personally obligatory upon the inhabitants of that country, who must repel the non-Muslims with whatever they can).¹⁷⁴

Jihād is also (personally) obligatory for everyone (able to perform it, male or female, old or young) when the enemy has surrounded the Muslims (on every side, having entered our territory, even if the land consists of ruins, wilderness, or mountains, for non-Muslim forces entering Muslim lands is a weighty matter that cannot be ignored, but must be met with effort and struggle to repel them by every possible means...)¹⁷⁵

These criteria lend assistance to understanding the legitimacy afforded Jihadis through Islamic jurisprudence. Regardless of non-Muslim presence in Muslim lands, they are required, when able, to conduct *jihād* at least once a year. Should non-Muslims forces

¹⁷³ibn Naqib, 600. Book O "Justice," o9.1, "The Obligatory Character of *Jihād*."

¹⁷⁴Ibid.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., 601. Book O "Justice," o9.3, "The Obligatory Character of *Jihād*."

invade or occupy Muslim lands, it becomes the duty of every capable Muslim to do whatever is necessary to drive them out. While such straightforward documentation does not reconcile with current Western-nation operations throughout the globe, there are specific provisions in Islamic law for *temporary* alliances and truces that would account for such exceptions.¹⁷⁶

Ultimately, the obligation to wage *jihād* is based upon the capability of both the community or the individual to do so. This aspect can be observed in the initial development of the religion itself. Muhammad's revelations focused initially on the well-being and establishment of the Islamic community and escalated to violence and conquest during the community's more prosperous years in Medina.¹⁷⁷ Once established with the knowledge and power to wage *jihād*, it then becomes the first order of business for the purpose of expanding the reach of Islam:

The call of Islam for this cause...does not concern only one nation with the exclusion of others, or one group with the exclusion of others, for Islam calls all people to its Word....Whosoever believes in this call and accepts it in a proper way, becomes a member of the 'Islamic Party'....As soon as the party has been established, it starts with *jihād* for the aim for which it has been founded.¹⁷⁸

The imperatives and strict rules guiding the physical conduct of *jihād* constrain its initiation unless Islam has been sufficiently established to ensure victory, for Allah does not sanction losing *jihāds*.¹⁷⁹ When waging war against non-Muslims would prove fatal to the local Muslim community, believers will, in the words of the Prophet, "return from

¹⁷⁶Ibid., 602, 604-605. Book O "Justice," o9.7, "Who is Obligated to Fight in *Jihād*" and o9.16, "Truces."

¹⁷⁷Reference section of this thesis titled "Progressive Revelation."

¹⁷⁸Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Al-jihād fī sabīl Allāh* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), 27-29; quoted in Peters, 108.

¹⁷⁹Yusuf Ali, 478, 862. *Sūra Tauba* 9.123. *O ye who believe! Fight the unbelievers who gird about you, and let them find firmness in you, and know that Allah is with those who fear Him.; Sūra Hajj* 22.40. *Allah will certainly aid those who aid His cause, for verily Allah is full of strength, exalted in might, able to enforce His will.*

the lesser *jihād* to the greater *jihād*.”¹⁸⁰ Ultimately, preservation of the *Ummah* is the prime consideration.

The Revolutionary Vanguard

Previous discussion of the *dar al-Islam* and its inherent obligation to usurp the *dar al-harb* implicates Islam as a revolutionary movement that began with its inception in the seventh century. In the context of history, Islam can be viewed as existing in a constant state of fluctuating revolutionary stages, perpetually striving to extend its borders. Twentieth-century Pakistani revolutionary Abul A‘la Mawdudi, speaks of the ongoing Islamic Revolution and the illustrative revolutionary leadership of the Prophet Muhammad:

Islam is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to alter the social order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals. ‘Muslims’ is the title of that ‘International Revolutionary Party’ organized by Islam to carry out its revolutionary program. ‘*Jihād*’ refers to that revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion which the Islamic Nation/Party brings into play in order to achieve this objective....There is no doubt that all the Prophets of Allah, without exception, were Revolutionary Leaders, and the illustrious Prophet Muhammad was the greatest Revolutionary Leader of all.¹⁸¹

More recently, in his book titled *The Stages of Islamic Revolution*, Islamic activist Kalim Siddiqui defines this visionary Islamic Revolution:

The Islamic Revolution is that point in time when all the elements that go to make the Islamic State come together and the Islamic State is set up. The Islamic Revolution is the mother of the Islamic State. The Islamic State is the infant that is born of the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic Revolution is the public expression and consummation of the power of a people that is necessary to establish the Islamic State. This power is the power of the Islamic Revolution. This power, and the blood of the masses spilled by the old order in its dying days legitimize the child, the Islamic State. At its birth, the Islamic State is protected

¹⁸⁰ Ibn Naqib, 599. Book O “Justice,” o9.0, “*Jihād*.”

¹⁸¹ Abul A‘la Mawdudi, *Jihād fi Sabilillah (Jihād in Islam)*, trans. Khurshid Ahma, (Birmingham: UK Islamic Dawah Centre, 1997), 3, 8-9; quoted in David Zeidan, “The Islamic Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial Battle,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 5:4, December 2001 [journal on-line]; available from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue4/jv5n4a2.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2007.

by its mother, the Islamic Revolution....For a period of time the Islamic State must be protected by the power of the Islamic Revolution.¹⁸²

Such rhetoric sounds flowery and imaginative to Western minds. However, to Jihadis it is a sober reality that is well under way. This is their vision of the future, and in their eyes, it is up to them to bring it to fruition.

Islam's perpetual struggle to assert itself continuously calls forth an internal element to establish the *dar al-Islam*. This vanguard for the Islamic Revolution has many faces, though most have the same ultimate goal. Author Stephen Lambert maintains that the Jihadi forces challenging the West throughout the globe today see themselves as this revolutionary vanguard. He asserts:

The enemy is a revolutionary—not a terrorist. The war he is engaged in is an epochal struggle between his ideas about the affairs of mankind and our ideas about the affairs of mankind....He views himself as the elite vanguard—a front-line force drawn from the broader Islamic milieu.¹⁸³

The apparent disparate actions of this revolutionary vanguard are somewhat explained by the fact that *jihād* is authorized without the permission of a caliph (head of state in a caliphate) if one does not exist.¹⁸⁴ In the absence of political leadership for the *Ummah*, the ideology becomes the sole unifying element for the numerous Jihadi factions. As the vanguard, they all are able to claim legitimacy as front-line defenders of Islam based upon qur'anic verses such as 9:122 and legal precepts that support it:

¹⁸²Kalim Siddiqui, *Stages of Islamic Revolution* (London: The Open Press, 1996), 79-80.

¹⁸³Stephen P. Lambert, *Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2005), 130-131.

¹⁸⁴ibn Naqib, 602. Book O "Justice," o9.6, "Who is Obligated to Fight in *Jihād*." It is offensive to conduct a military expedition against hostile non-Muslims without the caliph's permission (though if there is no caliph, no permission is required).

*Not all of the believers should go to fight. Of every section of them, why does not one part alone go forth, that the rest may gain knowledge of the religion to admonish their people when they return, that haply they may take warning.*¹⁸⁵

*Qur'an 9:122
Medinan Period Revelation*

Allah Most High prohibited the people to go out altogether in military expeditions and *jihād*, and ordered a segment of them to engage solely in becoming knowledgeable in the religion of Allah, so that when their brothers returned to them they would find someone qualified to give them legal opinion on the lawful and unlawful and to explain the rule of Allah the Glorious and Exalted.¹⁸⁶

In the words of Osama bin Laden himself, “Allah has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America. May Allah bless them and allot them a supreme place in heaven.”¹⁸⁷

In their eyes, this divine promise of heavenly favor for fighting in the cause of Allah means that the revolutionary vanguard is incapable of losing. They will either obtain victory for the *dar al-Islam* or they will secure high status in Paradise as martyrs for the insistent Islamic Revolution. The promise of obtaining high favor in the eyes of Allah is evidenced in the following verses from the *Qur'an*:

Not equal are those believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of Allah with their goods and their persons. Allah hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home). Unto all (in Faith) hath Allah promised good: but those who strive and fight hath he distinguished above those

¹⁸⁵Yusuf Ali, 478. *Sūra Tauba* 9.122. Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 1373): Fighting may be inevitable, and where a call is made by the righteous Imām it should be obeyed. But fighting is not to be glorified to the exclusion of all else. Even among those who are able to go forth, a party should remain behind—one in such township or circle—for purposes of study; so that when the fighters return home, their minds may be attuned again to the more normal interests of religious life, under properly instructed teachers. The students and teachers are soldiers of the *Jihād* in their spirit of obedience and discipline.

¹⁸⁶ibn Naqib, 17. Book B “The Validity for Following Qualified Leadership,” b2.2, “The Koranic Evidence for Following Scholars.”

¹⁸⁷Osama bin Laden, “Text of Statement from Osama Bin Laden,” Los Angeles Times, 07 October 2001; quoted in Lambert, 129.

*who sit (at home) by a special reward—Ranks specially bestowed by Him and forgiveness and Mercy.*¹⁸⁸

*Qur'an 4:95-96
Medinan Period Revelation*

*Therefore, when ye meet the Unbelievers (in fight), Smite at their necks; at length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly (on them): thereafter (is the time for) either generosity or ransom: until the war lays down its burdens. Thus (are ye commanded): but if it had been Allah's Will, He could certainly have exacted retribution from them (Himself): but (He lets you fight) in order to test you, some with others. But those who are slain in the way of God,—He will never let their deeds be lost.*¹⁸⁹

*Qur'an 47:4
Medinan Period Revelation*

Shari'ah law also affords special merit for the revolutionary vanguard fighting on the front lines against the *dar al-harb*:

In a time of *jihād*, when people give their all, and even their lives, for the common cause, they must be accounted more glorious than those who sit at home, even though they have good will to the cause and carry out minor duties in aid. The special reward of such self-sacrifice is high spiritual rank, and special forgiveness and mercy, as proceeding from the direct approbation and love of God.¹⁹⁰

Such codified martyrdom makes it extremely simple for Jihadis to recruit and employ growing throngs of Muslims as part of the Islamic revolutionary vanguard. Fourteenth-century Islamic scholar, ibn Taymiyyah, captured Islam's *can't lose* prospect of *jihād* when he stated, "Any individual or community that participated in it, finds itself between two blissful outcomes: either victory and triumph or martyrdom and Paradise."¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸Yusuf Ali, 211. *Sūra Nisāa* 4.95-96.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., 1378. *Sūra Muhammad* 47.4.

¹⁹⁰Ibid., 211. *Sūra Nisāa* 4.95-96. See Yusuf Ali's commentary on this verse (Note 614).

¹⁹¹ibn Taymiyya, 168.

As its vanguard, Jihadis claim ownership of the growing “power of the Islamic Revolution.”¹⁹² They have assumed the responsibility of engaging the *dar al-harb* at the behest of the *Ummah*. For the West to comprehend this struggle into which it has been drawn it must understand its relationship to the Jihadi vanguards and their overall *can't lose* strategy. Lambert cites author Paul Schulte in describing this strategy against the West:

In their revolutionary ardor, the vanguard is trying to draw the West into what Paul Schulte has called a spiral of *engrenage* (a French term for becoming enmeshed like cogs in interlocking gears in a repetitive cycle of atrocity and revenge). The revolutionary Islamic vanguard expects an overwhelming military response. One might argue that it is their strategy to purposefully target the West in such a way as to draw out massive military responses. They anticipate the loss of entire cadres of fighters, even while celebrating their martyrdom and heroic warrior status. Schulte explains that...the spiral of *engrenage* will over time: (1) increase their determination, (2) recruit new warriors and supporters, (3) gain political support, (4) delegitimize so-called moderate or secular regimes, and (5) bring about (eventually) war weariness, division, and self-disgust in the enemy population. The revolutionary Islamic vanguard is convinced that ultimately the cycle of *engrenage* will lead to a disengagement of the enemy.¹⁹³

Though the following citation from Brigadier S.K. Malik's work, *The Qur'anic Concept of War*, seems to contradict this vanguard strategy of *engrenage*, perhaps this approach for Western disengagement is merely part of the preparation for a much larger war:

The Qur'anic strategy comes into play from the preparation stage, and aims at imposing a direct decision upon the enemy. Other things remaining the same, our preparation for war is the true index of our performance during the war. We must aim at creating a wholesome respect for our *Cause* and our will and determination to attain it, in the minds of the enemies, well before facing them on the field of battle. So spirited, zealous, complete and thorough should be our preparation for war that we should enter upon the “war of muscles” having already won the “war of will.” Only a strategy that aims at striking terror into the hearts of the enemies from the preparation stage can produce direct results and turn Liddell Hart's dream into a reality.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹²Siddiqui, 79-80.

¹⁹³Lambert, 134.

¹⁹⁴S.K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War* (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1986), 58.

Such farsighted and inspired perspectives of Islam's ultimate goal spawn the question of whether al-Qaeda (Arabic for "the base") is actually a vanguard organization, or simply a phase of a much larger revolutionary campaign.¹⁹⁵

Section Summary

Jihād is obviously an inexhaustible topic within the realm of Islam. Yet, it necessarily provides focus and unity to the Islamic community as a whole. Other Jihadi underpinnings legitimize *jihād*, however it is *jihād* itself, serving as the instrument that transforms the *dar al-harb* into the *dar al-Islam*, that operationalizes these ideological underpinnings. It is this self-referencing legitimacy that makes *jihād* a growing threat for the West. Though the greater *jihād* and the lesser *jihād* are recognized concepts within Islam, they are not exclusive of each other. The internal struggle of the greater *jihād* can be considered a metaphor for the lesser *jihād*, which is defined through Islamic law as "war against non-Muslims...to establish the religion."¹⁹⁶ Through sacred commandments and *Shari'ah* law, Muslims are both communally and personally obligated to conduct *jihād*. Though carried out under strict guidance, these sources compel Muslims to wage *jihād* if they have the capability to do so. Regardless of their degree of active participation, however, Muslims may be afforded *jihād* credit based upon passive support for the cause. There is provision for such passive support through the calling forth of a revolutionary vanguard that fights for the establishment of the *dar al-Islam* on behalf of the entire *Ummah*. Jihadi factions throughout the globe view themselves as this vanguard and have taken possession of the ever-present Islamic

¹⁹⁵Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Al-Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment*, report prepared by Kenneth Katzman, 17 August 2005, 2; available from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33038.pdf>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2007.

¹⁹⁶ibn Naqib, 599. Book O "Justice," o9.0, "*Jihād*." Italics added by author for emphasis.

Revolution. It is the ideology of *jihād* that unites these apparently disparate factions as Islam's front-line element in its war against the *dar al-harb*. In their eyes, the Jihadis cannot lose because of Allah's promises of either victory for the *dar al-Islam* or high spiritual status in the afterlife. Regarding the Jihadis as the revolutionary vanguard of Islam, as *they* do, is crucial to the West's readiness for the future onslaughts inherent in the overall Jihadi campaign.

Chapter Summary

The deeply embedded theological and legal precepts discussed in this chapter are the foundational elements that motivate and sustain Jihadi conduct. These underpinnings offer a rooted perspective on Jihadi legitimacy with respect to the religion of Islam. Because these precepts are so fundamental to Islam it is impossible for Jihadis to have manipulated inherent vulnerabilities in the religion to justify their ideological aims. Rather, these underpinnings serve as a foothold for Jihadi activity and are the compelling force that has shaped their outlook on the world. In mobilizing these authoritative and institutionalized precepts, they attempt to legitimize their cause for the defense and expansion of Islam.

Since these ideological foundations are based almost exclusively upon sacred revelations and traditions, they remain largely fixed in the eyes of Muslims. The incontestability of the four sources of Islamic law, the *Qur'an*, *hadīth*, *ijma'*, and *qiyās*, leaves Islam unable to reform itself within the confines of classic Sunni Islamic law. This uncompromising acceptance further establishes the foothold of Jihadi behavior.

Through *naskh*, Jihadis claim the superiority of Islam over all other religions, declaring them null and void. Understanding how *naskh* also applies to the progressive

revelations Muhammad received during the four periods of his prophetic career sheds light on the supposed contradictions found within the *Qur'an*. Jihadis claim authority through the final word of Allah to wage war on the *dar al-harb*, or all that is non-Muslim, for the establishment of the *dar al-Islam*. They aim to force complete submission to Allah and the institution of Islam until the *dar al-Islam* has completely eclipsed the *dar al-harb*. It is the instrument of *jihād* that will forge this ultimately peaceful Islamic world.

Jihadis have found a secure foothold with these well-substantiated precepts, making Islam a ready-made ideology for Jihadi conduct. A much deeper and broader knowledge of these precepts throughout the West is critical. Perhaps a better understanding of the Jihadi worldview and the principles that govern their behavior will offer the West a more enlightening vista from which to assess its enemy.

CHAPTER 3: MAGNITUDE OF THE JIHADI THREAT

They tell us, sir, that we are weak; unable to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it be the next week, or the next year? Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction? Shall we acquire the means of effectual resistance by lying supinely on our backs and hugging the delusive phantom of hope, until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot?

*Patrick Henry
Address to the Virginia House of Burgesses, 1775*

*People don't want to feel that this is part of a single threat, because if you come to that conclusion—and I'm sure it's the true conclusion—then you have to do something about it.*¹⁹⁷

*Sir Martin Gilbert
British Author and Historian, 2006*

Chapter Introduction

This brief chapter serves to convey the imperative for the West to recognize the magnitude of the threat it faces. Because of the manner in which it has chosen to frame its understanding of the threat, the West has become trapped in a self-referencing spiral of cognition that has blinded it to the authenticity of Jihadi intentions. Conversely, Jihadis operate within a similar self-referencing spiral that emboldens their ideology's inherent design for conquest. The West has assumed that Jihadis are operating outside the normal conventions of war based upon their apparent *radical* or *extreme* techniques. It has underestimated Jihadi intentions because it appears they are not playing by the established rules of war. Unfortunately, the West has overlooked the fact that Jihadis have been simply conducting a campaign using a different set of rules altogether. They have clearly broadcast their intentions and offered countless declarations espousing their grievances with the West. Further, their centuries-old doctrine has been readily available,

¹⁹⁷Sir Martin Gilbert: *Obsession: Radical Islam's War Against the West*, prod. Raphael Shore and dir. Wayne Kopping, 60 min., documentary, 2006, digital video disc.

yet the West has failed to acknowledge the link between its enemy's words and deeds. The Jihadi threat is what it says it is, and no less. It is high time the West awakens to the genuine intentions of its Jihadi foes.

Opposed Self-Referencing Spirals

Section Introduction

Both the West and Islam are trapped within diametrically opposed self-referencing spirals of cognition. For the West, this spiral, based on a system of political correctness and mirror-imaging terminology, slowly whirls inwardly, ever-decreasing its capacity to deal with the threat it faces. The Jihadi system, on the other hand, spirals outwardly using a system of self-legitimizing principles that is expanding Jihadi influence among the Muslim population. Both suffer from a form of systemic paralysis making neither system amenable to change without severe cataclysmic shock. The danger for the West is that its spiral is tightening and slowly being eclipsed by the outwardly expanding spiral of the Jihadis—the West's works against itself, while the Jihadi system self-legitimizes and expands.

Centripetal Spiral of Cognition

The ever-tightening centripetal spiral that has trapped Western culture severely hampers its ability to secure itself against the internal and external threats posed by Jihadis. Political correctness has become the West's religion, devoutly avoiding offense of anything within its sphere of influence. Having forgotten its intellectual roots, the West has ceded the freedoms it offers to those who would take advantage of those liberties to introduce unhealthy concepts such as political correctness, skewed versions of multiculturalism, and intellectual emasculation. This has put the West in a defensive

mode allowing other world systems to exert influence and induce submission. The concepts just mentioned have created a self-referencing system that mirror-images itself upon its enemy, thereby blinding the West to the genuine intentions of a very fierce adversary. Having graduated from territorial conquest and having embraced pluralism, Western civilization cannot fathom the global ambitions of its Jihadi foes. This has led to a war on terrorism lexicon conforming to Western perspectives with a subsequent failure to clearly define the enemy. The resultant tail chase is a centripetal spiral of cognition that prohibits the West from acknowledging the magnitude of the Jihadi threat. Regrettably for Western civilization, this inward spiral works against itself and reduces its capacity to confront both internal and external hazards to its way of life.

Centrifugal Spiral of Cognition

In a like manner, the Jihadi cognitive system uses the religion of Islam as its foothold to legitimize its worldview. Jihadis are also trapped in a self-referencing spiral of cognition that legitimizes its inherent design for expansion and totalitarianism. This system is based upon a set of fixed, self-legitimizing rules in which the religion imposes the legal system, and the legal system imposes the religion. The Jihadi worldview is reinforced by Islamic precepts that suggest it is their holy duty as the revolutionary vanguard to wage *jihād* against all that is non-Muslim, enforcing submission for the establishment of the *dar al-Islam*. Because both the religion and *Shari'ah* law legitimize this ideology, it is impossible for them to break out of this cognitive spiral while maintaining theological and legal integrity. Islam's self-reinforcing inability to reform creates a type of systemic paralysis prohibiting a reframing of the Jihadi outlook. The circular logic associated with their worldview acts centrifugally because of its inherent

design for the subjugation of all that borders the *dar al-Islam*. Its design causes this spiral to expand outwardly, further emboldening those who view themselves as the vanguard of the Islamic Revolution. Unlike the inwardly tightening spiral of the West, this expanding spiral of cognition works for the Jihadis to broaden their influence.

Section Summary

Currently, these two spirals of cognition find themselves at extreme odds. One seeks to avoid confrontation, while the other pursues it vehemently. The centripetal spiral of Western thinking is being drawn inward by political correctness, willing intellectual emasculation, and a self-referencing framework that prohibits accurate enemy appraisal. The Jihadi cognitive system, on the other hand, acts in a centrifugal manner, spiraling outward because of its self-legitimizing, instinctive bent for conquest. Each entity is cognitively trapped and cannot break free, save a calamitous shock to either system. Without a rapid reawakening beforehand, this shock for the West could very well be the full manifestation of the outwardly expanding spiral of Jihadi influence.

Their Rules

Section Introduction

Part of the West's entrapment in its inward spiral of cognition is the fact that it is so used to playing by its own rules it has overlooked the fact that there may be a different rulebook which governs opponent play. No doubt, the West likes to play by its own set of rules, and judges the fitness of its opponents using those rules. Western civilization has assumed the Jihadis are simply not playing fairly in the international arena because of their appalling *unsportsmanlike conduct*. In light of a different rulebook, however, it might become apparent that they are actually having a better game than the West. To

turn the tide and win the game, the West must become intimately familiar with the other team's rulebook and game plan. Only by understanding the rules by which its opponents are playing can it undermine those rules and dominate the game.

Preference to Play by Own Rules

For centuries, Western civilization has prided itself on its adherence to the moral conduct of war. The atrocities of warfare warrant such rules to govern both *jus ad bellum* (justification for going to war) and *jus in bello* (conduct once engaged in war).

Throughout the history of Western civilization, when Western powers had to face each other, they largely adhered to the established rules of warfare. This history has conditioned the West to appreciate opponents who "conveniently play by the same rules."¹⁹⁸ History has also shown, however, that the West's *away-game record* against non-Western civilizations leaves much to be desired. As Michael Ignatieff so aptly states, "The lesson is clear: it is a form of hubris to suppose that the way we choose to wage war will determine how the other side fights. Our choice to wage 'clean' war may result in wars of exceptional dirtiness."¹⁹⁹ Unfortunately, the West's proclivity for assuming a fair fight has kept it from learning this critical lesson, and it now finds itself in an exceptionally dirty war.

A Different Set of Rules

Once again, the West has presupposed its Jihadi opponents are simply breaking the rules of war. Because their actions do not conform to Western perspectives, Jihadis are labeled with such ambiguous descriptors as *extremists*, *radicals*, or *terrorists*. Most Westerners believe that its challengers simply possess a different playbook and are

¹⁹⁸Frank G. Hoffman, "Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace," *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 300.

¹⁹⁹Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York: Picador, 2000), 200.

operating under the same set of rules. Not only is it a different *playbook*, the West has overlooked the fact the Jihadis use a different *rulebook*, as well. Their rulebook includes the *Qur'an*, *hadīth*, *Shari'ah*, and other deeply-seated cultural influences. The Jihadi imperative to play by *their* rules can be deduced from this purpose statement excerpt from *The Cairo Declaration*:

Reaffirming the civilizing and historical role of the Islamic *Ummah* which God made the best nation that has given mankind a universal and well-balanced civilization in which harmony is established between this life and the hereafter and knowledge is combined with faith; and the role that this *Ummah* should play to guide a humanity confused by competing trends and ideologies and to provide solutions to the chronic problems of this materialistic civilization.

Wishing to contribute to the effort of mankind to assert human rights, to protect man from exploitation and persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life *in accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah*...²⁰⁰

Not only are they playing by a different set of rules, one might also argue that Jihadis are playing a completely different game—and doing it quite well based upon *their* rules. The West has showed up to the playing field expecting to compete in a nine-inning game of baseball, when in fact, its opponents are trained and postured to win the FIFA World Cup Soccer Tournament.²⁰¹

Know *Their* Rules

To win, the West must first realize that its opponents are playing soccer. Secondly, it must become intimately familiar with the rules of soccer so that it may understand the dynamics of the game and the layout of the playing field. Understanding *their* rules will help the West decipher its opponent's game plan and ultimately develop

²⁰⁰Organization of the Islamic Conference, *The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam*, 05 August 1990; available from <http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohrislam1990.htm>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2007. Italics added by author for emphasis.

²⁰¹FIFA is the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (French for International Federation of Association Football); available from <http://www.fifa.com/en/index.html>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2007.

an effective counterstrategy to defeat it. Oddly, it is still acceptable for the West to play baseball—as long as it understands the rules of baseball *and* soccer, and determines the other team's soccer strategy—for wooden bats and baseballs hurt far worse than spongy soccer balls. Using this framework, the West can either play soccer, or it can build a baseball field, and get such a dominating ballgame going that its opponents no longer have the wherewithal to play soccer. Currently, the West is confused about its national pastime and runs the risk of having it changed for them from baseball to soccer.

Section Summary

The above analogy may seem a lighthearted way of describing the West's current situation, but it must be interpreted with solemn appreciation for what it means. Western civilization is at a critical juncture in history. It is so used to playing by its own regulations that it has fundamentally ignored the fact that its enemies employ a completely different set of wartime rules. It has also missed the fact that the game is perpetually in play and that it must be prepared to continually dominate the playing field. The West must recognize what sport its opponent is playing, the rules that govern his game, and finally, the opponent's strategy for winning. Assuming the adversary is engaging in unsportsmanlike behavior is folly if the rules of the game are not understood—crying *foul ball* means nothing on the soccer field. Western civilization is quickly losing touch with its identity because it has chosen to watch the competition on television from the venue of a comfortable sofa, rather than going to the arena itself. Its willing forgetfulness makes it increasingly vulnerable to those who would like to change

the rules of the game entirely. “We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.”²⁰²

It Is What It Says It Is

Section Introduction

While the West struggles with its identity crisis, the Jihadi threat grows like a malignant tumor within an unsuspecting victim. The West has yet to fully realize what it is up against and what it will need to accomplish to survive as a civilization. The Jihadis have unambiguously declared *jihād* against the West and have stated their intentions for global domination. Regrettably, there has been no outcry from the Muslim community at large citing misrepresentation of Islam. Western civilization has been faced with a similar problem before in its history, albeit within its own borders. Adolf Hitler also clearly broadcast his intentions to the world through his sadistic public statements and fiery literature. Unfortunately, the world watched from the sidelines as he cultivated an “ideology of oppression, violence, and hate.”²⁰³ Millions died before this ideology was recognized for what it truly was. Simply believing him would have prevented this colossal loss.

Clear Intentions

The twentieth century saw a resurgence in Islamic revolutionary thought that yielded the Jihadi vanguard seen today. The seeds planted by intellectuals such as Qutb, al-Qaradawi, Siddiqui, and Khomeini have grown and flourished, and are now bearing fruit in the form of *jihād* against the West. The Jihadis today have clearly stated what they intend to do. Osama bin Laden’s August 1996 *Declaration of War Against the*

²⁰²Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2003), 21.

²⁰³President, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006): 5.

Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places and the World Islamic Front's February 1998 *fatwa* titled *Jihād Against Jews and Crusaders* are just two examples airing specific Jihadi grievances and intentions. There are countless video tapings and media statements issued by the Jihadis telling the West what it intends to accomplish, as well as volumes of Islamist literature stating the expansionist imperatives of the revolution. Most importantly, the Jihadis have broadcast to the world the foundational documents that prescribe their conduct. The *Qur'an*, *hadīth*, and *Shari'ah* clearly reflect the stated intentions of the West's contenders. The following press conference statement by President Bush seems to suggest he understands the threat we face:

And I know there is an international Jihadi movement that desires to do us harm and they have territorial ambitions. The reason I know this is that's what they've told us. And part of their territorial ambition is to have safe haven in Iraq. That's what they've said. That's what the enemy has clearly said. And it seems to me that the Commander-in-Chief ought to listen to what the enemy says.²⁰⁴

Unfortunately, his administration has been unable to clearly articulate this message to Western peoples to make *them* "listen to what the enemy says." Paradoxically, the easiest thing for the West to do is believe its enemies, for in the end it is going to be much deadlier to not believe them.

No Muslim Outcry

Disappointingly, there has been no worthy challenge from the Muslim world to discount the rhetoric and actions of the Jihadi vanguard. There have been no Islamic outcries regarding misrepresentation of their faith, Muslim pulpits spew hate for the infidel West, and growing numbers of Muslims are joining the ranks of the Jihadi vanguard. As British journalist Melanie Phillips has noted:

²⁰⁴George W. Bush, Press Conference, White House Rose Garden, 14 June 2006; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060614.html>; Internet; accessed 05 January 2007.

...jihadi Islamism, whatever its historical or theological antecedents, has become today the dominant strain within the Islamic world, that its aims if not its methods are supported by an alarming number of Muslims..., and that, to date, no Muslim representative institutions have arisen to challenge it.²⁰⁵

The only challenge appears to be an internal vie for ownership of the Islamic Revolution—in other words, a competition for distinction as *the* vanguard for Islam and control over the ultimate design of the *dar al-Islam*. Perhaps the *Ummah's* silence communicates acceptance of the revolutionary front that fights on their behalf. From the *Ummah's* perspective, it has nothing to lose. If the Jihadis succeed, the *dar al-Islam* expands—if they fail, it was simply not Allah's will. Sadly, the West is more likely to hear a chorus of disapproval for simple cartoons or misinterpreted historical quotations. Television images of cheering Muslims from around the globe on September 11, 2001 bespeak a tacit desire for the downfall of Western civilization.

Mein Kampf

The West has faced such monumental opposition before. At the risk of sounding cliché, citing the exploits of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany serves to conjure lessons learned from what some would call simpler times. The West is foolish if it thinks such atrocities cannot occur again. Hitler laid out his plan for domination in his book *Mein Kampf* and in subsequent documents and speeches besmirching the existence of the Jews. In declaring Nazi Germany a superior race worthy of world dominion, he stirred an ideology that blinded its constituents to the atrocities it was committing. In hindsight, it can be seen as a horrific ideology that led to the slaughter of millions of innocents. At the time, however, it was considered a fantasy ideology that was not given much credence, similar to the Jihadi ideology of today. As Stephen Coughlin states:

²⁰⁵Phillips, 23.

To fully appreciate the threat posed by *Mein Kampf*, one had to start with the assumption that it was true and valid because it was true and valid for those who believed it, governed in furtherance of it, and killed because of it.²⁰⁶

This understanding of Nazism is analogous to the Jihadi ideology confronting the West. It is a real threat because it is true and valid to those Jihadis who believe it and are compelled to act upon it. Hopefully, the lesson of Hitler and his Nazi regime can be a lesson learned rather than a lesson observed for the West. It would be a shame to undergo such sacrifice and carnage for failure to regard the warnings of the past. Like the Jihadis, Hitler also had a struggle about which he wrote—he called it *Mein Kampf*. In Arabic, *Mein Kampf* translates to *My Jihād*.

Section Summary

The Jihadi threat is what it says it is. Its declarations of war, its vast quantities of media statements and supporting literature, and mostly its actions as legitimized by sacred texts and Islamic jurisprudence, all proclaim Jihadi intentions for conquest and dominion over the West. The Muslim community remains relatively silent while the vanguard seeks to carry out the mandate of the *dar al-Islam*. Based upon the precepts which underpin Jihadi activity, no such objection should be expected. Much like the late 1930s, Western civilization faces a new threat to its way of life. Adolf Hitler taught the world a lesson it should never forget. His “ideology of oppression, violence, and hate” was based upon a system of espoused superiority, expansion, ethnic cleansing, and offensive warfare—among other vile concepts.²⁰⁷ He clearly broadcast his intentions to the world. Unfortunately, few believed him until the sting of his *struggle* became a reality for millions across Europe. All they had to do was believe.

²⁰⁶Coughlin, “To Our Great Detriment: Never Considering the Jihadis May Be Right About Islamic Law,” 20.

²⁰⁷President, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006): 5.

Chapter Summary

Western civilization is under attack. The threat opposing it is well indoctrinated, equipped, and trained to carry out its strategic plan for world domination. The West must awaken to the magnitude of this Jihadi threat. Western society currently exists in a self-referencing *inward* spiral of cognition that has crippled its ability to remain aware to danger. The resultant systemic paralysis leaves the West vulnerable to a complementary self-referencing *outward* spiral of cognition perpetuated by a system of self-legitimizing precepts. In a way, this Jihadi worldview also experiences a form of paralysis in that it is ill-designed to accept any type of reform. Western civilization must awaken to the fact that its enemies are legitimately playing a different game guided by a completely different set of rules. They have plainly stated their intentions and their centuries-old doctrine is readily available—the West need only to believe it to comprehend the scale of the Jihadi threat. This chapter will close with a large citation that underscores the significance of exhaustively understanding the nature of the enemy:

The enemy is a revolutionary—not a terrorist. The war he is engaged in is an epochal struggle between his ideas about the affairs of mankind and our ideas about the affairs of mankind. As the enemy has told us, “here we have a clash of two visions of the world and the future of mankind. The side prepared to accept more sacrifices will win.” He has not hijacked his religion and he is not its nominal follower—rather, he is an Islamic purist, and passionately follows the example of his Prophet Mohammad. He desperately seeks to restore the preeminence of Islam—to purify the Muslim world of corrupt and apostate rulers, and to bring the entire world under the Islamic rightly guided way of life. He does not represent a local ethnicity or group. Instead, he is an ideologue, fueled by a utopian vision of a worldwide sacred geography, called the Islamic Caliphate—a unique and historical fusion of politics and religion. As a result, he is engaged in a tectonic struggle to change the world as we know it, and will use every means available—including mass genocide—to fulfill his fantasy. He is the lead agent in this transnational revolutionary struggle and religious phenomenon. He views himself as the elite vanguard—a front-line fighting force drawn from the broader Islamic milieu. The resentment phenomenon that prevails throughout the global Islamic community ensures that he has a sympathetic

audience—if not actively, then at least passively supportive. He also draws tacit and illicit support from regimes and governments who share his passion to humble the secular West. He wields a diverse arsenal and is skilled not only in killing and destruction, but also in political propaganda and religious manipulation. He is driven by historical imperatives, a millennial tradition of Islamic doctrine, and the supererogatory promises of his eschatological foundation—which offer him an afterlife in exchange for martyrdom. In life, he gains great approbation as a religious warrior in the cause of Allah. In death he gains paradise. Worst of all, he has nothing to lose. He will not yield, he will not negotiate, and he will not compromise. This is the enemy—the revolutionary Islamic vanguard.²⁰⁸

The Jihadi threat is what it says it is. Western civilization stands at a significant threshold in history. The history books will tell the story of a great epochal battle between two incompatible ideologies. Wisdom demands focused concern for both the content and the language of those history books. Nine-tenths of wisdom, however, consists of being wise in time.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸Lambert, 130-131.

²⁰⁹Roosevelt, 299.

CONCLUSION

*If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged! ...The war is inevitable—and let it come! I repeat it, sir, let it come. ...Gentlemen may cry, Peace, Peace—but there is no peace. The war is actually begun! The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms! Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!*²¹⁰

Patrick Henry

Address to the Virginia House of Burgesses, 1775

Western civilization currently lacks the vision to recognize the magnitude of the threat it faces. Mostly, this is due to an unwillingness to see because of the unrelenting grip of political correctness and the untouchability of Islam. Western civilization has willingly accepted an intellectual emasculation which has stifled its ability to think critically for itself. In essence, the West is being told what to think about the Jihadi threat and its ideological underpinnings. The West also lacks vision because it has mirrored the nature of the enemy, thereby perceiving his acts of war as *extreme* and *radical*. The resultant ambiguous lexicon used in the war on terrorism has created a plethora of vague definitions of the enemy and a bomb burst of effort throughout Western governments.

Primarily, what the West fails to see are the underpinnings of Jihadi conduct. These fixed rules of Islam make it a ready-made ideology that suits the Jihadis' insatiable goals for territorial conquest and a religious-based totalitarian government. *Naskh*, or abrogation, declares all other belief systems of the world invalid and sheds light on the seemingly contradictory guidance found within sacred Islamic texts. Because it also applies to the progressive revelations given to Muhammad and the records which

²¹⁰Henry.

chronicle his exploits, certain qur'anic verses and *hadīth* abrogate previous guidance on related topics.

The Jihadi worldview is also shaped by the bipolar concept of the *dar al-Islam*, the abode of peace and Islam, and the *dar al-harb*, the abode of war and hostility. It is the eschatological imperative of the *dar al-Islam* to eclipse the *dar al-harb* in order to establish the peaceful reign of Islam throughout the earth. This paradox of inciting war to establish peace gives the Jihadis a planning horizon that far exceeds that of the West. Legal definitions of the *dar al-harb* are very specific and suggest that Muslim lands can be considered all those previously under Islamic rule where Muslims are allowed to safely practice even a portion of their faith. The requirement for the *dar al-Islam* to wage war against the *dar al-harb* also suggests that Islam has been engaged in a perpetual clash of civilizations from the time of its origin.

Until the full manifestation of the *dar al-Islam*, Jihadis seek to enforce submission to Islam through one of three *subjective* options: conversion, dhimmitude, or execution. The privilege of dhimmi status for People of the Book will only be granted if deemed advantageous and harmless to the *Ummah*. It is just as likely that non-Muslims could be designated as *kufir* for their unbelief—a crime punishable in *Shari'ah* by execution. Given the imperative for the People of the Book to worship according to the *original versions* of Allah's revelations that establish their faiths, it is unlikely that the covenant between the Muslim state and the People of the Book will always be honored.

Lastly, *jihād* stands as the underpinning that *operationalizes* all the others. Though greater *jihād*, the struggle within oneself, and lesser *jihād*, physical war, are both spiritually accepted concepts within Islam, *Shari'ah* officially defines *jihād* as “war

against non-Muslims...to establish the religion.”²¹¹ *Jihād* is both theologically and legally obligatory based upon both the community’s and individual’s capability to wage it. *Jihād* serves as the primary instrument for advancing the ever-present Islamic Revolution. This sacred duty lies in the hands of an elite vanguard called forth from the ranks of the *Ummah*. The Jihadi forces confronting the West view themselves as this privileged front-line force.

A grasp of these Jihadi underpinnings is important to the West because they suggest a magnitude of danger beyond the West’s current estimation of the threat. Both the West and the Jihadis are trapped within diametrically opposed self-referencing spirals of cognition. While the West’s spirals inwardly and hampers its ability to detect threats to its survival, the Jihadi spiral slings outwardly, ever-expanding and legitimizing their worldview. Western civilization has assumed that the appalling actions and apparent fantasy ideology of the Jihadis are outside the rules of international warfare. It has failed to recognize that the Jihadis operate very legitimately by a completely different set of rules. The Jihadi threat is what it says it is, and nothing less. Jihadis have explicitly told the West what they intend to accomplish and their ancient doctrine has been made readily available—the West simply has to read that doctrine and believe what it says.

The underpinnings of Jihadi conduct serve as a foothold upon which the enemy plans to further execute its coherent strategy for world domination. Western civilization’s survival is at stake. Only if it acquires eyes to see the true nature of this mounting threat, will Western civilization be able to counter the Jihadi menace and avoid the promised annihilation. For the sake of liberty, the author would be pleased to learn that this proposition is wrong.

²¹¹ibn Naqib, 599. Book O “Justice,” o9.0, “*Jihād*.” Italics added by author for emphasis.

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VITA

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Major Klein is happily married to the former Anjanette Stokes of Texas and has two boys, Michael and Sammy. He was commissioned upon graduation from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1994 with a Bachelor of Science degree in astronautical engineering. He has performed flying missions in all regions of the world including the Americas, Europe, Asia, and the Pacific. He has served in major USAF operations including Operation JOINT GUARD, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, and most recently in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Major Klein has held various unit leadership positions during his Air Force career such as Operations Officer, Flight Commander, Chief of Squadron Weapons and Tactics, and Chief of Squadron Training. A senior pilot with 3,000 flying hours, including 340 combat hours, he is a C-130 Evaluator Pilot, Mission Commander, and Weapons Officer.

